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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the suitability of the Finnish Defence Forces’ 
NH90 helicopter for parachuting operations with the T-10 static line parachute system. The 
work was based on the Army Command’s need to compensate for the reduction in the 
outsourced flight hours for the military static line parachuting training.  
 
The aim of the research was to find out the procedures and limitations with which the NH90 
IOC+ or FOC version helicopter could be used for static line parachutist training with the T-
10B/MC1-1C parachutes. The research area was highly complicated and non-linear. Thus 
analytical methods could not be applied with sufficient confidence, even with present-day 
computing power. Therefore an empirical research method was selected, concentrating on 
flight testing supported with literature study and some calculated estimations. 
 
During three flights and 4.5 flight hours in Utti, Finland on 17−20 September 2012, a total of 
44 parachute drops were made. These consisted of 16 dummy drops and 28 paratrooper 
jumps. The test results showed that when equipped with the floor mounted PASI-1 anchor 
line, the deflector bar of the NHIndustries’ Parachuting Kit and Patria’s floor protection 
panels the Finnish NH90 variant could be safely used for T-10B/MC1-1C static line 
parachuting operations from the right cabin door at airspeed range of 50−80 KIAS (∼90–150 
km/h). The ceiling mounted anchor lines of the NHI’s Parachuting Kit were not usable with 
the T-10 system. This was due to the static lines’ unsafe behaviour in slipstream when 
connected to the cabin ceiling level. 
 
In conclusion, the NH90 helicopter can be used to meet the Army Command’s requirement 
for an additional platform for T-10 static line parachutist training. Material dropping, the 
effect of additional equipment and jumping from the rear ramp should be further studied. 
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Static line, parachuting, NH90, helicopter, flight testing, T-10 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
Tämän  tutkimuksen  tarkoituksena oli selvittää Suomen Puolustusvoimien käyttämän NH90-
kuljetushelikopterin soveltuvuus pakkolaukaisulla tapahtuvaan laskuvarjohyppykoulutukseen 
T-10-laskuvarjojärjestelmää käyttäen. Aihevalinta perustui Maavoimien tarpeeseen saada 
NH90-helikopteri hyppykoulutuskäyttöön, tähän tarkoitukseen aiemmin osoitettujen 
ulkoistettujen lentotuntikiintiöiden pienennyttyä. 
 
 
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli määrittää ne menetelmät ja rajoitukset, joilla NH90 IOC+ tai 
FOC -version helikopteria voitaisiin käyttää laskuvarjohyppykoulutukseen T-10B/MC1-1C 
-laskuvarjokalustolla. Aihealue oli fysikaalisesti hyvin monimutkainen, joten laskennallisia 
menetelmiä ei voitu luotettavasti käyttää. Tästä johtuen työ tehtiin empiirisin menetelmin, 
painottuen koelentoihin sekä niitä tukeneeseen kirjallisuustutkimukseen ja analyysiin. 
 
 
Koelennot toteutettiin Utin Jääkärirykmentissä 17.–20. syyskuuta 2012. 4,5 lentotunnin 
aikana suoritettiin yhteensä 44 koepudotusta, koostuen 16 nukkepudotuksesta ja 28 
koehypystä. Tulokset osoittivat, että NH90-helikopteria oli turvallista käyttää 
hyppykoulutukseen T-10-kalustolla matkustamon oikeasta sivuovesta lentonopeusalueessa 50–
80 KIAS ( 90–150 km/h). Edellytyksenä oli, että koneeseen oli asennettuna lattiaan kiinnitetty 
PASI-1-ankkurihihna, NHIndustries:n laskuvarjohyppyjärjestelmän suojatanko sekä Patrian 
lattiasuojalevyt. Kokeet osoittivat myös, että NHI:n laskuvarjohyppyjärjestelmän matkustamon 
kattoon kiinnitetyt ankkurihihnat eivät soveltuneet hyppytoimintaan T-10-kalustolla. 
 
 
NH90-pakkolaukaisuhyppäämisen osalta tulisi jatkossa tutkia hyppääjien käyttämän 
varustuksen vaikutusta, materiaalinpudotuksia ja perärampin käyttöä. 
 
 
Tutkielma on laadittu englanninkielisenä huomioiden keskeisen lähdemateriaalin vakiintunut 
termistö ja tarkoitus hyödyntää tekstiä European Defence Agencyn (EDA) NH90-
käyttäjämaiden tiedonvaihdossa [4]. Työn tietoturvaluokitus on julkinen. 
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6INTRODUCTION OF THE T-10 STATIC LINE 
PARACHUTING CAPABILITY TO THE NH90 
HELICOPTER
1. INTRODUCTION
In early 2012, following a major reduction in the outsourced flight hours for the static 
line parachutist training, the Finnish Defence Forces’ (FDF) Army Command initiated 
actions to have the Army’s own NH90 helicopter approved for this purpose. Otherwise 
a considerable drop was foreseen in the number of static line parachute training jumps, 
especially for the enlisted personnel. The NH90 transport helicopter was a natural choice 
as the fleet was already located in the same Army unit as the paratroopers, the Utti Jaeger 
Regiment (UTJR). 
The 2001 acquisition contract between the Finland’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) and 
the supplying company NHIndustries (NHI) required the NH90 to be capable for static 
line parachute jumping. Due to various developments during the program this capability 
was never fully substantiated as required by the contract (see extract in Appendix 2’s Figure 
28). Until 2012, only partial evidence was delivered by the NHI using calculations and 
analysis [10; 11; 13; 15]. Due to the Army Command’s requirement, the Finnish Defence 
Forces now needed to complete the substantiation, in practice with flight testing, as the first 
operator worldwide.
As a preparation for the national qualification of the parachuting system, the FDF and the 
NHI agreed the following: the NHI would deliver a draft test plan for the necessary flight 
tests and the FDF would provide the helicopter, parachutes, jumpers, flight test personnel 
and other required assets. It was also agreed that the NHI was financially responsible for 
potential test related damage and modification costs, if these were caused by the NH90 
design characteristics. [22]
The responsibility to carry out the necessary tests was given to the Utti Jaeger Regiment’s 
flight test office. This was the starting point for the research and the author’s involvement in 
it as a flight test engineer. The study was written in English to facilitate information exchange 
within the European Defence Agency’s (EDA) NH90 User Group. The used concepts and 
definitions are clarified in Chapter 1.2 and the terms and abbreviations in Appendix 1.
1.1 The question and scope of the research
The main question of the research was:
 1.  With which procedures and limitations can the NH90 helicopter be used for static 
line parachutist training with the T-10B/MC1-1C parachutes?
7The following sub questions were raised to support in answering the main question:
 2. What are the NH90 helicopter and the T-10B/MC1-1C parachute systems?
 3. What are the relevant user and authority requirements for the NH90 static line 
parachuting system and capability?
 3. How does the static line parachuting system, as incorporated in the NH90 
helicopter, behave during flight tests and what are the possible areas requiring 
further development?
The scope of the research covered static line parachute jumping with T-10B/MC1-1C 
parachute system from the Finnish Defence Forces’ NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopter’s 
IOC+ version, concentrating on the aircrew point of view. The research emphasis was on the 
flight test planning, test results and the limitations and procedures based on the results. The 
testing was limited to day time visual meteorological flight conditions, jumping from the 
right cabin door, maximum airspeed of 80 knots (150 km/h) and to the maximum jumper 
weight of 150 kg. The detailed test setup and conditions are in Chapter 4.1. The paratrooper 
techniques and procedures were only covered to the necessary extent to understand the 
conclusions. The military aviation authority approval process was not covered by more than 
a brief outline in Chapter 3.2, where also the requirements concerning the approval are 
presented.
The security classification of this study is unclassified based on the NH90 program’s 
Classification Guide (see Appendix 3) and on the classification of the US Army Field Manual 
for static line parachuting [32], containing comparable level of information.
1.2 Concepts and definitions
The concepts requiring specific definition in the study are static line parachute jumping, 
anchor line, incremental approach (in testing), and slip ball. Other terms and abbreviations 
are explained in Appendix 1, with the exception of the most common SI units such as 
“kilogram”. These have been assumed as generally known. In expressing numbers, thousands 
are not separated by commas or spaces to avoid misunderstandings among people not used 
to the English convention. For example one thousand is expressed as 1000 (not 1,000 or 
1 000). The decimal indicator is a dot in the English text and a comma in the Finnish 
abstract.
Static line (SL) parachuting (method) means a system where a line attached to a jump platform 
automatically opens a jumper’s main parachute after exit from the platform. The jump 
platform is usually an airplane or a helicopter. For example the massive airborne assaults to 
Normandy in 1944 were done using the static line parachuting method. See an example of 
military static line parachuting training with the T-10 parachutes in Figure 1.
8Figure 1. Static line jumping with the T-10 parachute system from a C-130 aircraft. 
In the middle of the picture a jumper has just exited the aircraft. The arced 
canopy suspension lines are exposed and the main canopy has been pulled out 
from its container by the static line (not visible) attached to the aircraft [38]
Anchor line is a cable or webbing connected to a jump platform (e.g. an aircraft) in order to 
provide a hard point for attaching the jumpers’ static lines.
Incremental approach is a term used in flight testing to describe a philosophy of progressing in 
small steps from the known to the unknown regime. This is the basic method for controlling 
risks when for example expecting strong non-linear responses or when testing complicated 
systems. Incremental approach is also used to mitigate the adverse effects of the so-called 
“cliff-edge points”, where a small increase in input results in an abrupt and a non-linear 
response − often to a dangerous direction and with no preceding warning.
Slip ball or slip indicator (Figure 2) is a basic indicator in almost any aircraft where the 
pilot is protected from the airstream and thus cannot feel the direction of the relative wind. 
The slip ball indicates the direction and the relative strength of the side slip of a fuselage. 
In the cockpit a side slip is felt as a lateral force. Normally side slip is not desired, as it 
creates additional drag increasing fuel consumption. Potentially it also increases structural 
vibrations.
9Figure 2.  The slip ball or slip indicator is often a combination of a curved tube and a ball 
inside it (mechanical version) or a similar presentation on a display. In this pic-
ture the slip indicator is part of a “Turn and Bank” indicator [39], an essential 
device in instrument flying. When there is no side slip, the ball is in the middle 
between the brackets
1.3 Research methods
The main unknown was the dynamic behaviour of the static line + deployment bag 
combination after a parachutist separation. This resulted in an extremely complicated 
problem for the analytical methods. Modelling was needed for the time dependent path 
of a non-rigid body (the static line + deployment bag) in a turbulent airstream with several 
initial values around a complex structural boundary of the helicopter’s fuselage. Based on the 
author’s previous knowledge of the limitations of computational fluid dynamics (CFD), this 
kind of a scenario was practically impossible to solve reliably even with modern computing 
power. Thus a quantitative research method was chosen, based on the empirical observations 
and conclusions made during the ground and flight testing phase. The empirical work 
was supported by literary study and interviews, which provided the input values, initial 
constraints and valuable considerations on the safe conduct of the tests.
The literary study was the main source of information for Chapters 2 and 3 whereas the 
empirical part is covered by Chapter 4. 
1.4 The main reference sources and source criticism
The main reference sources were the NH90 program’s qualification documentation 
concerning static line parachuting system [10; 11; 13; 14; 15] & [21; 22], the NH90 
Interactive Electronic Technical Publication (IETP) [17; 19], Dan Poynter’s “The Parachute 
Manual” [26], U.S Army Field Manual for static line parachuting systems and training [32], 
NHIndustries’ test plan draft for static line jumping [18], Eurocopter’s experimental test 
pilot Didier Delsalle [2], UTJR’s paratrooper instructors’ experiences about similar systems 
[34] and finally the test team’s flight test results [3]. 
10
Majority of the sources were well recognised and had established their position. The author 
considers the sources reliable with the following reservations and considerations. 
The NH90 qualification documentation about the parachuting system was purely analytical 
and based on approximated calculations. Neither Eurocopter nor the NHI had experience 
on dropping static line parachutists from the NH90, especially with the T-10 or a similar 
system. Thus the analysis results (concerning static line behaviour in helicopter slipstream) 
were taken only as initial guesses for the flight test planning. 
The U.S Army Field Manual [32, p. 17-1–18-14] provided solutions for several comparable 
helicopters, UH-1 and UH-60 for example. However, the dimensioning principles were not 
provided, hence the solutions could not be taken as such without complementary analysis. 
The NHI’s test plan draft was very general and not inspected by flight testing professionals. 
This was compensated by the test team’s own experience and by consultation from 
Eurocopter’s highly experienced experimental test pilot Didier Delsalle. 
Finally, the flight test results’ applicability and completeness needed to be kept in mind while 
writing any final conclusions. The number of test points (repetitions) was selected based on 
the test team’s judgment. The random variations were, by experience, believed to have been 
covered with sufficient reliability. The test team consisted of a team of experienced test 
pilots and jumpmasters with thousands of flight hours and parachute jumps, respectively. 
Considering the long experience of the military organisation to utilise the NH90 T-10 static 
line system, this was believed to provide a sufficient certainty for the conclusions. 
Keeping in mind the aforementioned considerations and as the final conclusions are based 
on full scale test results, the outcome of the research is considered reliable and fully applicable 
within the scope of the research (see Chapter 1.1).
2. TEST ITEMS
This chapter presents the main components relevant for the research. The main components 
are the T-10 parachute system (Chapter 2.1), the NH90 TTH IOC+ helicopter (Chapter 
2.2), the NHI’s Parachuting Kit for the NH90 helicopter (Chapter 2.3) and the specifically 
designed “PASI” prototype floor mounted anchor line (Chapter 2.4).
2.1 The T-10 static line parachute system
The T-10-series and MC1-series parachutes are made by the Mills Manufacturing 
Corporation, USA, for military static line airborne operations - see example in Figure 1. 
The T-10-series includes a non-steerable parabolic canopy and the MC1-series a similar but 
steerable canopy. Both have a nominal canopy diameter of 35ft (10.7m). The T-10 system 
was designed in the early 1950’s for the US government for demanding military use and has 
been widely used since with few modifications. [6; 8] 
11
The T-10 main parachute consists of five major components - the harness assembly, the 
riser assembly, the deployment bag, the pack tray, and the canopy: assembly (Figure 3). A 
reserve parachute is used in conjunction with the main parachute and fitted in front of the 
jumper [32, p. 2–1]. The Figure 4 shows the T-10 system as worn by a paratrooper.
Figure 3. Steerable MC1 version of the T-10 parachute system. The components clock-
wise from the left: canopy assembly, harness assembly, the deployment bag 
(including static line), the riser assembly and the pack tray in the bottom mid-
dle. The T-10 system is identical but without orifices in the canopy [24]
Figure 4.  T-10 parachute harness fitted on a paratrooper. The main canopy is on the 
jumper’s back and the reserve canopy on his front. On the left the static line’s 
snap hook is attached to the aircraft via an anchor cable and on the right the 
static line’s folding on the main parachute container is shown [32, p. 2–18]
 
12
The T-10B version used by the Finnish Defence Forces originates from the year 1976. 
The T-10B features an anti-inversion net at the edge of the canopy (Figure 3) intended 
to eliminate the so called “line-over” malfunctions. The FDF also uses the steerable T-10 
variant: the MC1-1C. The MC1-1C’s canopy is made from F111 fabric, which provides a 
smaller rate of descent than the T-10B canopy. Otherwise these two - T-10B and MC1-1C 
- are functionally identical from the research point of view, with the exception of static line 
snap hooks. Details of these parachute types are provided in Appendix 4’s Table 6, Table 
7 and Figure 31. The T-10B snap hook connected to the PASI-1 anchor line is shown in 
Figure 11.
The static line assembly including all the components shown in Figure 5 is the only part of 
the T-10 system which remains attached to the aircraft after the jumper has exited. The T-10 
deployment bag (D-bag), which is connected to the end of the static line, is constructed of 
an 8.8-ounce cotton sateen cloth and its dimensions are 46 x 30 x 13 cm (18 x 12 x 5 in). 
The static line is made of Type VIII yellow nylon and is permanently attached to the D-bag. 
The static line is 4.6 meters (15 feet) long and has a tensile strength of 16.0 kN (3600 lb / 
1633 kg). [32, p. 2-3]. The effective length, up to the pack opening loop is 3.85 meters and 
the total length of the static line assembly up to the end of the deployment bag (locking stow 
panel) is 5.3 meters. For static line assembly parts’ nomenclature, see Figure 3 and Figure 5. 
Concerning the use of the static line assembly with a composite-build airframe it is important 
to notice that there are no exposed or hidden metal parts in the T-10 static line, other than 
the snap hook. It is common that the deployment bag hits the aircraft’s fuselage after a 
jumper has exited and the parachute has separated from the bag. However, the lack of metal 
parts in the T-10 static line assembly – as exposed in the airstream – virtually eliminates the 
risk of impact damage to the NH90 helicopter’s carbon fibre fuselage. 
Figure 5.  Static line and nomenclature on the left [32, p. 2-3]. On the right the static line 
assembly is shown with the green deployment bag (bag body) attached to it. 
The total length of the assembly from the tip of the metallic snap hook until 
the end of the deployment bag (locking stow panel) is 5.3 meters
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2.2 The NH90 helicopter
The NH90 is a medium sized, twin engine, multi-role military helicopter manufactured 
by the NHIndustries, NHI, which is a consortium owned by three major European 
aerospace companies: Eurocopter, AgustaWestland and Stork Fokker Aerospace. The first 
NH90 prototype flew in 1995 and since 2001 the helicopter has been sold to 13 countries 
worldwide. 
The NH90 is technically very modern. It is the world’s first serial production helicopter with 
a full fly-by-wire flight control system and a full-composite structure. The NH90 fuselage is 
mostly assembled from carbon fibre sandwich structure, but includes also aramid and glass 
fibre parts with titanium and steel reinforcements. 
The Finnish NH90 variant is specified as TTH TFIA (Figure 6). The abbreviation TTH 
describes the army version “Tactical Transport Helicopter”. TFIA identifies the national 
variant: “Transport, FInnish Army”. The Finnish NH90 variant is primarily intended 
for carrying 16 troops or more than 2500 kg of cargo or conducting search and rescue 
operations, fire fighting and medical/casualty evacuation missions. The TTH variant’s 
maximum normal take-off weight is 10600 kg and the maximum cruise speed 300 km/h. 
[36] The main characteristics, performance values and dimensioning of the helicopter are 
presented in Appendix 4’s Table 8, Figure 32 and Figure 33. 
The IOC+ (Improved Operational Configuration) is the latest model delivered to FDF by 
the end of 2012 and is also the version used in this study. The IOC+ lacks some equipment 
and capabilities, but in terms of suitability for parachuting operations it is fully representative 
of the final contracted version, the FOC (Final Operational Configuration). 
Figure 6. NH90 TTH TFIA IOC+ (tail number NH-215) in hovering flight. The right cabin 
door is open with the black Parachuting Kit deflector bar installed aft of the 
door on the outside. Some other test relevant items are also pointed out
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Comparing to other helicopters and relevant for this study, the only significant new design 
feature of the NH90 is the composite structure. A composite structure can be made very 
efficient both structurally and aerodynamically, but it is sensitive to any sharp impacts. 
The composite structure is in this respect problematic in that a major internal structural 
damage might look small and insignificant on the surface. For test planning and execution 
the integrity of both the external surface and the internal floor had to be considered. The 
relevant risks and their mitigation are covered in Chapter 4.1.4. and in Appendix 10.
2.3 The NHI’s Parachuting Kit for the NH90 helicopter
The NH90 Parachuting Kit, as introduced by the manufacturer, is specifically intended for 
static line parachuting from the right cabin door. The Parachuting Kit’s main components 
are shown in Figure 7. The other components are the Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) in the 
cabin and cabin signal panel in the cockpit, see Figure 8. The only item not part of the basic 
TTH configuration is the deflector bar (Figure 7), which is for protecting both the door 
frame and the static line from excessive wear. The “anchor lines” in the cabin’s ceiling are for 
attaching the static line snap hook but also the loadmaster’s safety strap. [14] See Appendix 
4, Figure 33 for a detailed diagram of the ceiling cable location. 
The boarding and maintenance steps in Figure 7 are part of the normal NH90 configuration, 
but they are mentioned in conjunction with the Parachuting Kit as they help the jumpers to 
exit the helicopter. The boarding step also bears loads caused by the static line, see Figure 24. 
The strength substantiation for dynamic loads has been presented in references [11; 13] and 
[15]. The behaviour of the attached T-10 static line in slipstream after jumper separation 
has been estimated by analysis in [10]. The part numbers and weight breakdown of the 
Parachuting Kit is in Table 9 of Appendix 4. 
15
Figure 7.   Parachuting Kit main components as viewed from the forward right side of 
the fuselage (H/C nose on the right) [15, p. 8]. Not shown component is the 
Parachuting Drop Light control panel in the cockpit. The deflector bar (Static 
Line Protection Kit) exists to prevent static lines getting caught by outboard 
installations or getting damaged by any sharp edges [13, p. 4]
     
Figure 8.   Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) panel is on the left and its control panel (in 
cockpit) on the right. The green (“JUMP”) and yellow (“STAND-BY”/ “STOP”) 
lights have been symbol coded to be readily readable even if operating with 
NVGs. [14, p. 13] When approaching the jump site the cockpit crew selects 
CABIN SIGNAL switch to AMBER illuminating amber light on the cabin PDL, 
meaning “STAND-BY” (or “STOP/ABORT” if lit after GREEN light). At the exit 
point GREEN position is selected, which illuminates green light on PDL and 
initiates an audio tone
When using the T-10 system the major challenge with the NHI’s Parachuting Kit is illustrated 
in Figure 9. In the Figure 9 a T-10B static line, visible in the middle, is attached to the cabin 
ceiling anchor lines. The static line, including the deployment bag extends approximately 
4 meters out of the door. There are several potential items – marked with circles - which 
might get damaged by the tightening (“start”), up-swinging (“max”) or trailing static line 
(“trim”). See the respective calculated positions of the static line in Figure 10. According 
to the analysis 80 knots would be the most critical case in terms of main rotor clearance 
whereas 40 knots would provide the safest outcome. However, 80 knots is much more 
desirable from the parachutists’ point of view than 40 knots: the faster the airspeed, the 
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faster the parachute opening. The slipstream “feel” during exit is then also more comparable 
to fixed wing aircraft.
Before the start of the tests, the item most probably damaged was thought to be the right 
position light at the forward-right edge of the sponson. The most dangerous contact 
possibility was with the main rotor blades. The main rotor has a strong structure and an 
enormous inertia.  Therefore the main rotor blades would probably not be much affected by 
a tangled static line. However, if the tangled static line would rip out of the door the anchor 
cables (lines) including all the other static lines, that would be a very dangerous situation. 
This risk could be avoided by attaching the static lines to the cabin floor as in many other 
jump aircraft, including US Army’s UH-1 and UH-60 Blackhawk [32, p. 17–4 & 17–8]. As 
a method of risk mitigation and in accordance with the incremental approach philosophy, 
the floor anchor line was implemented for the first drops during the flight tests. This is 
further elaborated in Chapter 2.4.
Figure 9.  The potential damaging aircraft items (circled, solid and dashed) due to static 
line dynamic behaviour during and after parachutist exit. The light blue dash 
line circles indicate items that might be damaged if the static line would be 
attached to the floor
       12 
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Figure 10.  The static line (SL) positions at Start (parachutist separates), Max (highest 
point of static line and bag) and Trim (final position in slipstream) for 40, 60, 
80 and 100 knots according to NHI’s calculations [10, p. 8]
2.4 “PASI”–Prototype Anchor for Static line
 Implementation
The attachment of the static line to the standard anchor line in the ceiling was analysed to 
cause a risk of inadequate static line deployment bag – main rotor clearance at airspeeds 
between 63 and 97 KIAS (knots, indicated airspeed) [10, p. 9]. The risk of a static line vs. 
main rotor contact was eliminated by the test team by manufacturing a prototype anchor 
line, to be mounted onto the cabin floor at least for the first drops. A greatly increased safe 
static line vs. main rotor separation could then be achieved. The Prototype Anchor for Static 
line Implementation (PASI, Figure 11 and Figure 12) provided also a safe mean to validate 
the analysed results of static line upswing Figure 10. After the first observations an entry into 
the more risky regime (ceiling anchor attachment) could then be made, as feasible. 
The prototype anchor line was designed and manufactured in Utti Jaeger Regiment in 
cooperation with the author and an FAA Master Rigger certified FDF jumpmaster. Prototype 
anchor’s installation was authorised by the Finnish Air Force Material Command (FINAF 
AMC) with the TMT installation order AM/132/NH, 12.9.2012, see Appendix 5’s Figure 
35. 
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Figure 11. Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation, version 1 (PASI-1) attached 
to the front left part of the cabin, onto two “green” attachment points be-
low the row of troop seats. In bottom right, a T-10B static line’s snap hook is 
shown
The prototype anchor line and its method of attachment are dimensioned for the worst 
loading case in parachuting operations as presented in the NHI’s analysis. This scenario 
assumes a malfunction, where an exiting jumper weighing 150 kg would get tangled to the 
static line at 4.2 meters, between the pack opening loop and the deployment bag. Then the 
jumper’s velocity would be 9.78 m/s and the resulting peak pulling force on the static line 
when stopping the jumper’s fall 11.76 kN (equalling ~1200 kg). [11, p. 15] 
This kind of a malfunction is considered possible in theory and taken as the design loading 
case also for the FDF tests, even though its probability of occurrence is very small. For 
example: in Finland no such case is known during the history of military or civilian 
parachuting, while hundreds of thousands of static line jumps have been made.
The PASI’s attachment onto the floor has a coefficient of safety (CoS) of 1.4 against the limit 
load of the tie-down points (see Figure 34 of Appendix 4). By definition, up to the limit 
load no deformation of structure is expected. The minimum coefficient of safety against 
the ultimate load (“break load”) of the floor attachment is 2.1. The ultimate strength of the 
cabin floor’s attachment points is 25kN.
The prototype anchor’s design is simple. It provides the lowest possible loading on the floor 
attachment points, has little risk for tangling due to its positioning and can easily be stored 
away from the middle of the cabin floor. The minimum tensile strength of the anchor and 
any of its components is 22.3 kN (2270 kg, 5000 lbs), resulting in the minimum CoS of 
1.9 for the “PASI” in the design load case. Two versions of the prototype anchor were made 
for the tests: a shorter one (PASI-1) and a 50 cm longer one (PASI-2). The length of the 
PASI-1 anchor was designed based on judgment by experience so that only the minimum 
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reasonable length of the static line would be exposed out of the door. This was balanced with 
the requirement of having a sufficient length for safe canopy vs. fuselage separation. The 
two anchors could then be used to quickly modify the trailing deployment bag’s location in 
slipstream during the tests if problems were encountered. The prototype anchor components 
are listed in Table 10 (Appendix 4).
Figure 12. The PASI-1 anchor line and two separate Quick Release Cargo Rings, com-
monly used in transport aircraft. See list of components and their specifica-
tions in Table 10 (Appendix 4). The total length of PASI-1 is approximately 1 
metre.
3. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SPECIFIC 
 PARACHUTING SYSTEM
The applicable requirements are divided in two categories: user and authority requirements. 
The user requirements cover mostly the functional and maintenance aspects whereas the 
authority requirements cover the airworthiness aspects. There is however some overlap 
between the two categories. 
In this chapter the word shall is used to denote an essential, mandatory requirement that 
must be fulfilled. The word should is used to indicate an optional requirement, where 
fulfilment is desired but not mandatory.
3.1 User requirements
The end user for the NH90 TFIA’s parachuting system is Utti Jaeger Regiment. Operating 
the parachuting system is always a joint task for the Special Jaeger Battalion’s paratroopers 
and the Helicopter Battalion’s aircrew. The user requirements – combining both the 
paratrooper and the helicopter operator’s point of view - can be formalized from the test 
plan as follows [29]:
 1. The NH90 parachuting system shall allow dropping static line parachutists 
equipped with T-10B or MC1-1B parachute systems at an airspeed of at least 60 
knots (110 km/h), with a desired minimum airspeed of 80 knots (150 km/h)
 2. The jump procedure shall be suitable (simple, robust) for the training of conscript 
paratroopers
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 3. The jump procedure shall enable jumping with rucksacks and similar, up to a 
maximum paratrooper exit weight of 150 kg.
 4. The jump procedure shall enable adequate working facilities in the cabin for two 
jumpmasters and one loadmaster in addition to the paratroopers
 5. The jump procedure shall not mandate any structural or other significant 
modifications (like shortening of the static line) to the standard parachute system
 6. The jump procedure shall not compromise the helicopter’s structural integrity, or 
cause significant additional maintenance burden on either the helicopter parts or 
the parachute static lines or other parts due to excessive wear and tear
 7. The jump procedure should enable loads of at least eight and stick of at least four 
paratroopers and the procedure should not set any additional weather constraints 
compared to those generally regulating parachuting operations.
These user’s requirements apply for “Phase I” clearance of the T-10 system. Later phases 
include tactical items and other equipment. However, the foreseen updates due to later tests 
concern only the aforementioned requirements number 1 and potentially 3.
3.2 Authority requirements
The approval of any system to be installed in a Finnish military aircraft is governed by 
the military airworthiness requirements and advisories established by the Finnish Military 
Aviation Authority, FIMAA. In airworthiness issues it is assisted by the Quality and 
Airworthiness department (LLOS) of the Finnish Air Force Material Command.
In leading principles the Finnish military airworthiness regulations are rather similar to 
civilian airworthiness regulations like the FAR-29 commonly used as reference for large 
civilian transport helicopters. For the scope of this study the relevant FIMAA requirement 
documents are the Military Aviation Advisory SIO-Ma-Lt-005: “Airworthiness requirements 
for military aircraft” [30] and Military Aviation Regulation SIM-Ma-Yl-013: “The approval 
and maintenance of parachutes and safety equipment used in military aviation” [31]. The 
requirements of the latter document are in practice covered by SIO-Ma-Lt-005. Therefore 
SIM-Ma-Yl-013 is not referenced in the list below. Both document headers are translated 
from Finnish as no official English translations were found. 
In brief, the relevant authority requirements for the static line parachuting system used in 
this research are as follows (translated from Finnish):
 1. The NH90 parachuting system shall be airworthy, i.e. it must be so designed, 
manufactured, equipped and maintained that it can be safely used for aviation 
(Chapter 2.2 of [30]);
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 2. The system shall meet its specification. The safety relevant and essential characteristics 
and features have to be substantiated empirically (Chapter 6.2 of [30]);
 3. The system shall be type inspected and approved for its intended use (Chapter. 2.3 
and 6.1 of [30]. Author’s note: The responsible for managing and controlling the type 
inspection and approval is the aircraft type certificate holder – in this case the Finnish 
Air Force Air Material Command).
 4. The qualification shall cover and present, as applicable, the following items (Chapter 
6.2.1 of [30]):
   o Type marking (name, type number etc.) and modification state;
   o Effect on weight, centre of gravity, moment of inertia;
   o Main dimensions;
   o Structure and components;
   o Method of operation;
   o Performance characteristics;
   o Requirements for installation; 
   o Effects on other aircraft systems;
   o Reliability;
   o Safety;
   o Inspection, maintenance, repair, transport and storage requirements;
   o Instruction, training and user competence requirements.
 5. If flight testing is required for substantiation, a test plan shall be made. It must 
include among others the test limitations and safety instructions (Chapter 8.2 of 
[30]).
The authority approval process goes – in brief – as follows: After it has been substantiated 
and shown that NH90 static line parachuting system fulfills the listed airworthiness 
requirements and the user requirements in the previous chapter, a type inspection certificate 
or another applicable documents (for small changes) is issued by the FINAF Air Material 
Command, usually by its Quality and Airworthiness Division (LLOS). The system is then 
normally released to line service using the FDF’s TMT system. The TMT can be explained 
as “airborne systems related technical change and information data system”, which manages 
airborne systems related documents between the type certificate holder and the end users. 
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4. CONDUCT OF THE TEST AND TEST RESULTS
4.1 Test setup
The draft test plan delivered by the NHI on 9 May 2012 [22] was complemented and 
finalized by the UTJR flight test office, with valuable consultation from experimental 
test pilot Didier Delsalle of the Eurocopter Flight Test Department [2]. As the planned 
tests included many unknown and potentially hazardous factors, the final test plan [29] 
incorporated an incremental approach (Chapter 1.2) to minimise the risks for personnel, 
helicopter and equipment. Parachuting experience with the FDF’s earlier Mi-8 transport 
helicopter [41] as well as already developed free fall jumping methods for the NH90 [40] 
were also utilised in the planning.
4.1.1 General arrangement and test conditions
All testing took place on Utti airfield, Finland on 17-20 September 2012. The standard 
ground preparations for static line jumping as per the FDF rules and regulations were 
observed. The airfield emergency rescue service was available in normal readiness. One 
UTJR’s MD500 helicopter was used as a chase aircraft to assist the test aircraft’s crew as 
additional eyes and for documenting the test using a video camera. Emergency landing pad 
was prepared (but not assembled) for the unlikely case of landing gear extension failure due 
to static line entanglement. Other general test conditions are shown in Table 11 (Appendix 
6).
Complementing to what is mentioned in Table 11, for each test the aircraft configuration 
included:
 – A fully operational Parachuting Kit, see Chapter 2.3;
 – 15 standard TTH troop seats configured as shown in Figure 19;
 – Patria cabin floor protection panels (to avoid dents due to static line hooks slamming 
the floor after exit), Figure 13;
 – “PASI” anchor line (1 and/or 2 as applicable) and the tape protections in accordance 
with AM/132/NH, Appendix 5;
 – Protective tape as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14 and a video camera at the cabin 
door, see Figure 15.
The flight tests were documented using simultaneously four video cameras: one fixed at 
the forward edge of the right cabin door (Figure 15), one in the cabin used either by the 
flight test engineer (FTE) or the loadmaster (LM), one in the chase helicopter and one on 
the ground. Part numbers of the test relevant aircraft items are presented in Table 12 of 
Appendix 6.
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4.1.2 Test equipment and assisting devices
The following modifications and installations were done to the test helicopter. The standard 
composite floor was protected by plywood protection panels (P/N PNH252300010) made 
by Patria Aviation, Halli. The total weight of the panels was 40-45 kg and the total thickness 
8 mm (4 mm plywood + 4 mm padding). [5] As the protection panels had coarse anti-slip 
strips, the door side edge of the panels was covered with a combination of aluminum tape 
and duct tape, Figure 13. This abrasion layer prevented damage to the static lines during 
jumps. 
Figure 13. The right side cabin boarding step with Patria’s floor protection panels and 
the abrasion taping installed. The aluminium or “high-speed” tape was of the 
following type: 3M, width 50 mm, P/N 425 BWB 1194–38. The duct tape type 
was Würth 50 mm x 50 m SUPERBLACK, P/N 1985 505 05
Some aluminium tape was also added to round up other sharp features as the front edge of 
the search light below the right sponson and the hatch of the SSU3 access door on the right 
aft fuselage, see Figure 14.
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Figure 14.  Test setup with aluminium tape: right search light assembly front edge (round-
ing), SSU3 hatch’s butterfly nut (rounding) and maintenance step (securing). 
Two reference lines were also added to the right aft fuselage to ease the moni-
toring of static lines’ vertical position from the chase A/C
For documenting all the exits and the static lines’ behaviour after jumps, a video camera 
was temporarily installed below the winch man trim (WTR) unit at the forward edge of the 
right cabin door, see Figure 15. The camera was attached with three cable ties and secured 
with one safety wire to the WTR. The camera was set up at the smallest possible resolution 
of 640x480 pixels, which provided continuous recording for 55 min. Installation sideways 
provided maximum viewing angle along the fuselage in horizontal direction, which was of 
main interest due to the estimated static line movement path.
                         
Figure 15.  Contour HD 1080p digital video camera, facing towards the tail of the heli-
copter, installed with cable ties below the Winch Man Trim (WTR) unit
The parachutist test dummies used by FDF are shown in Figure 16. The size of the dummies 
is as follows: height 102cm, width 50cm and thickness 30cm. The weight of one dummy 
is 100 kg.
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Figure 16.  The parachutist test dummies used by the FDF. On the right a dummy is shown 
at the cabin door with the T-10 harness on. Two people are normally required 
to handle the 100 kg dummy and push it from the door
The jumpmasters, loadmaster and the flight test engineer as well as the cockpit crew were 
all connected to the helicopter’s intercommunication system (ICS) with NH90 compatible 
Alpha helmets (Figure 17). The ICS connection points for the cabin personnel were as follows: 
the loadmaster used Master Station Unit 3 (MSU3), the jumpmaster 1 (JM1) MSU6 and 
the jumpmaster 2 (JM2) used Secondary Station Unit 1 (SSU1). Both the loadmaster and 
the two jumpmasters used loadmaster harnesses. LM was secured at the right side guidance 
cable (anchor line), JM2 was secured to the left side guidance cable and the JM1 to floor 
cargo attachment point at the LM seat position. For the occupants’ positioning on the cabin 
during flight, see Figure 19. The aircrew used emergency parachutes in combination with 
life vests, Figure 17. This parachute could also be worn in combination with the Cabin 
Safety Harness, CSH 2-1560 (Airsafe Sweden Ab), see Figure 18. The installation orders for 
the use of the emergency parachutes and the safety harnesses are in Appendix 5’s Figure 36 
and Figure 37, respectively.
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Figure 17.  Helmet Integrated System Ltd’s Alpha-helmet (P/N: SCA0079946), Pioneer 
Aerospace Corporation’s emergency parachute (P/N 2711-519) and Beaufort 
Ltd’s Helicopter Flight Jacket (P/N: A356800A01/2/3) worn by a crew member
Figure 18.  Emergency parachute worn with Airsafe Sweden ab’s Cabin Safety Harness 
CSH 2-1560. The connection point for the attachment strap is visible at the 
back below the parachute container
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4.1.3 Flight envelope and test limitations
All tests were done in day time visual flight rules (VFR) conditions in straight and level 
flight, with the exception of side slipping during the test item #2 (Chapter 4.2.2). The 
jumps with dummies and jumpers were flown with the slip ball centred (without side slip). 
All tests were flown with the ATT flight control mode.
The following envelope was covered by the tests:
	 •	 Airspeed	range:	40…80	KIAS;
	 •	 Sideslip:	-2/3…+2/3	ball	(for	static	line	tow	test,	item	#2,	Appendix	6’s	Table	11);
	 •	 Altitude:	between	1000	ft	AGL	(dummy	drops)	and	3000	ft	AGL	(approximately	
1050 and 3050 ft respectively with the standard pressure setting 1013 mbar);
	 •	 Ground	wind	and	turbulence:	up	to	15	knots	(8	knots	during	jumps),	no	turbulence;
	 •	 Outside	air	temperature:	+13°C…+15°C.
The NH90 flight manual limitations were observed, except for the Parachuting kit / 
Guidance cable limitation: “Parachute jumping using the parachute kit is not allowed” [20, p. 
O-86]. This limitation existed because the system was not yet qualified by the NHI. The test 
plan authorised ignoring this limitation [29].
The complete list of the test limitations is presented in Appendix 7. 
Based on the risk analysis (Appendix 10) it was also decided that parachutes were worn by 
test aircraft crew during the first drops with dummies and personnel. During these first 
drops the jump altitude was 3000 ft AGL to facilitate reasonable possibilities for emergency 
egress for the crew.
4.1.4 Aircraft loading
Flight Manual weight and centre-of-gravity (CoG) envelope were observed during the 
tests. Figure 19 illustrates a typical loading case for the initial climb and on the jump run. 
The figure also shows the jumpers’ exit order, movement directions and other personnel’s 
positioning in the cabin. These all were defined by the test team during the ground test 
phase. Figure 20 from an early test session visualises the exit position and the static lines’ 
routing in the cabin.
Example calculations for mass and centre-of-gravity are provided in Appendix 8. As a 
summary, no CoG limitations existed for jumpers’ seating order or exit positioning in any 
practical combination, assuming a jumper’s average maximum weight of 100 kg. When 
the jumpers would be equipped with heavy rucksacks (assumed exit weight 150 kg), the 
longitudinal and lateral CoG could in theory be exceeded in some cases. These cases are 
taken into account in the test limitations, listed in Appendix 7.
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For repeatability of the results, the height and weight of the jumpmasters, loadmaster and 
the maximum and minimum height of the paratroopers is documented in Appendix 6, 
Table 13.
Figure 19.  The seat configurations for 15 troop seats and an example of positioning in 
the cabin during the flight. The example load includes 10 parachutists, two 
jumpmasters, a loadmaster and the test conductor (FTE). JM = Jumpmaster, 
LM = Loadmaster, FTE = test conductor / videographer. Floor drawings are 
from [5]
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Figure 20.  Ground demonstration of a four-man stick exit. Note that the static lines have 
too much slack in this test situation. On the right is the estimated positioning 
of the static lines after parachutist separation – there is no interference with 
the exiting jumpers
4.1.5 Text matrix and risk assessment
The master test matrix is in Appendix 9. The aircrew - an experimental test pilot, a co-
pilot, an FTE and a loadmaster - participated in all the tests. A chase helicopter with a 
videographer took part in all the flight tests. The jumping took place from the right cabin 
door only. All other doors and hatches were closed on the jump runs.
The risk analysis summary is presented here. Its details and the description of the hazard 
level determination and residual risk classification is presented in Appendix 10. The three 
most important unknown hazard factors were: 
 1. Static line up-swing at different airspeeds, especially the minimum vertical clearance 
with the main rotor;
 2. Static line contact with the fuselage after parachute separation and the potential 
subsequent damage;
 3. Static line or deployment bag entanglement in helicopter lower fuselage projections 
during jump or when being pulled in by the jumpmaster.
The risk mitigation concentrated especially on these three cases. The first point was managed 
by starting the tests with the safest airspeeds as indicated by the Industry analysis [10], 
using the floor anchor line at least for the first drops and by attaching only one static line 
to the anchor for the first tests. The second point was managed by starting with the lowest 
airspeeds (the least energy for up-swing), using the floor mounted anchor line for the first 
tests and taping any hazardous extruding aircraft parts. The third point was covered by first 
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flying the static lines only, checking their behaviour in the slipstream for various possible 
end-state positions and by a careful JM/LM cooperation during the static lines’ retraction 
phase. Finally, if a static line would have gotten entangled, the crew could have aborted the 
testing and landed.
After the risk mitigation actions, the worst residual risk consisted of a small probability for 
aircraft damage and/or personnel injury (risk category B). This meant that the risk level was 
higher than in normal flight service but acceptable. 
4.2 Test results
The following chapters – 4.2.1 through 4.2.4 – present the test results in writing and with 
sets of video snap shots. The video recordings are available on request from the flight test 
office of Utti Jaeger Regiment’s Helicopter Battalion. The comparison between the calculated 
and the actual static line dynamic behaviour is presented in Appendix 11.
4.2.1 Test #1: Ground assessment
The test is outlined in master test matrix item #1 in Appendix 9. The main outcome 
from test the item #1 (Ground assessment) was verifying the occupants’ positioning and 
movement routes in the cabin as well as the test equipment installation, personnel actions 
and communication during all phases of the flight, including emergencies. During ground 
tests also the methodology for dropping the dummies was checked and practised. For 
example the setup presented in Figure 19 was consolidated during Test #1.
Concerning the test items, the fit of the Parachuting Kit’s deflector bar’s two middle 
attachment points were excessively tight, possibly due to paint layers. When installing the 
deflector bar with a standard 200g maintenance hammer it was considered questionable 
whether the attachment points’ integrity would endure repeated removals and installations. 
This feature was however acceptable for further testing.
4.2.2 Test #2: Static lines’ behaviour in slipstream
The test is outlined in the master test matrix item #2 (Appendix 9). The testing was initiated 
with assessing the behaviour of the T-10 static lines in slipstream with all the three anchor 
line versions: PASI-1, PASI-2 and NHI’s guidance cables. The airspeed range was 40-80 
KIAS. The loadmaster released the static lines manually and incrementally into the airstream, 
monitoring their behaviour during various amounts of side slip induced by the pilot. See 
examples of the side slip tests at 40–50 knots in Figure 21 and in Figure 22. The test results 
for PASI-1, the shorter floor anchor line are in Table 1 and Table 2, the results for PASI-2 
(50 cm longer floor anchor line) are in Table 3 and the results for the NHI’s anchor line are 
in Table 4.
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Table 1. Test results for PASI-1 (short, floor mounting) with one static line
Figure 21. One static line + D-bag below the sponson at 40–50 KIAS with PASI-1. On the 
left the situation with slip ball on the left (side slipping to the left) and on the 
right with slip ball on the right (side slipping to the right)
 
Test case Airspeed (KIAS) 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One static line 
below the spon- 
son 
 
 
 
40 
Slip ball centred: The static line circled clockwise (looking aft from the 
door) with a diameter of 2 m so that the D-bag slightly contacted the 
sponson-fuselage junction’s lower surface at the top of the rotation. With 
the slip ball 2/3 to the left, the D-bag moved to circle below the sponson 
and with slip ball 2/3 to the right, the D-bag moved below the fuselage. 
 
50 
Compared to 40 KIAS, the D-bag stabilised and the circle diameter 
diminished to 0.5 meters. With slip ball ½ to the left, the static line 
slightly touched the main landing gear (MLG). 
 
 
 
60 
At 60 KIAS the circling was slow and basically just small sideways 
movement between the MLG and the fuselage-sponson junction, 
amplitude   20 cm. With slip ball ½ to left, the D-bag just crossed the 
MLG tyre line. With ball ½ to the right, the D-bag moved at the fuseage- 
sponson junction. 
70 The D-bag circled in an ellipse: width 1.5 m, height 0.5 m. 
 
80 
The  D-bag  circle  diameter  diminished  to  0.5  m,  but  the  frequency 
increased. Slip ball ± 2/3 moved the D-bag between MLG tyre and 
sponson-fuselage junction. 
 
 
 
 
One static line 
above the spon- 
son 
 
 
 
40-50 
The D-bag reached just over the sponson in longitudinal direction, at the 
RWR sensor level. The static line rested without motion above the 
sponson’s coarse strips and flapped against the end of the sponson. 
With slip ball ½ to left, the bag moved against the fuselage. With ½ to 
right, the SL moved 5 cm inwards from the formation light. 
 
 
60->80 
Accelerating from 60 KIAS, the flapping increased. With slip ball ± ½ the 
D-bag remained between the fuselage and RWR sensor. When reeling 
in, the bag started to circle rapidly and violently at Chaff and Flare 
Dispenser (CFD) level. 
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Figure 22.  One static line + D-bag above the sponson at 40–50 KIAS with PASI-1. On 
the left is the situation during side slip to the left (i.e. slip ball on the left). The 
static line is leaning onto the formation light. On the right is the static line’s 
position during side slip to the right. 
Table 2.  Test results for PASI-1 (short, floor mounting) with four static lines
 
 
Test case Airspeed (KIAS) 
 
Observations 
 
 
 
 
4 static lines 
below the 
sponson 
 
 
40 
The static lines were reeled out one by one. A group of 2 lines made a 
circle of 2 m in diam. A bundle of 3 and 4 lines flied calmly, remaining 
together. With slip ball ½ to the left, the bags stabilised at  
 
1 m  outside 
of the sponson and 1.5 m below it. 
50 The bags oscillated vertically, contacting the sponson occasionally. 
 
60 80 
At 60 KIAS the oscillation was reduced. By increased airspeed the bags 
started rising towards the sponson, making a slight contact with it. 
 
80 With slip ball 2/3 to the right, the bags rose to the junction of the sponson and the fuselage. 
4 static lines 
above the 
sponson 
 
40  80 
 
The same observations as with one static line, see Table 1. 
 
–
–
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Table 3. Test results for PASI-2 (long, floor mounting) with one or four static lines
 
Test case Airspeed (KIAS) 
 
Observations 
 
 
One static line 
below the 
sponson 
 
40 
The circling amplitude of the bag was greater than with PASI-1: the 
diameter was vertically 4  5 m (estimated). 
60 Circling diminished with airspeed, being   1 m  in  diameter at 60 KIAS . 
 
80 The D-bag circled at 0.5 m diameter and could be seen above the sponson. 
 
One static line 
above the 
sponson 
 
40 The D-bag reached beyond the sponson longitudinally and flew at the intersection of the sponson and the fuselage. 
 
80 
With increased airspeed the flapping amplitude increased and the D- 
bag started pounding the fuselage. At 80 KIAS the sideways amplitude 
of flapping was 0.5 m. 
 
 
4 static lines 
below the 
sponson 
 
40 Four SLs were reeled below the sponson. The bags circled with a large diameter as a bundle. 
 
60 
With  increased  airspeed  the  bundle  rose  up  and  aligned  with  the 
fuselage.  At  60  KIAS  the  D-bag  bundle  could  be  seen  above  the 
sponson. 
80 The bundle made a slow circle with a diameter of 0.5 m. 
4 static lines 
above the 
sponson 
 
N/A 
Not tested as the static lines’  behaviour with PASI-1 was generally 
better  at  the  previous  test  points >  Testing  with  PASI-2  was 
discontinued. 
 
–
–
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Table 4.  Test results for the NHI anchor line (ceiling mounting)
During one of the static line retractions at 80 KIAS, the D-bag got stuck to the engine #2’s 
start fuel drain pipe in the right MLG wheel bay. The drain pipe bent forward approximately 
15°.	This	very	minor	incident	was	reported	to	the	NHI	with	Service	Request	SR	1-7914270.	
As a solution it was concluded that if the D-bags got stuck during retraction, the JM should 
give some slack and try again. The fluttering movement would most probably guide the 
D-bag via another route and prevent bending of the drain pipe. Since this first occurrence, 
no entanglements occurred. 
 
Test case Airspeed (KIAS) 
 
Observations 
One static line 
below the spon- 
son 
 
40  80 
 
The behaviour and positioning was similar than with PASI-2. 
 
 
 
One static line 
above the spon- 
son 
 
 
 
 
40  80 
The  line  had  a  tendency  to rise  along  the  deflector  bar.  This  was 
controlled manually so that the SL did not rise above the lower edge of 
CFD. At 70 KIAS the D-bag reached up to the aft cabin window and 
swung vertically ± 1m about the window’s lower frame. 
The D-bag was reeled in at 40 KIAS and it dragged along the top 
surface of the sponson, getting briefly stuck somewhere. When passing 
the CFD, it started circling violently, as with previous times. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One static line at 
door upper edge 
level (vertically) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40  60 
When reeling out the SL it was observed that a side slip affected the SL 
very strongly. With ½ slip ball to the left, the D-bag suddenly swung 
upwards towards the engine cowlings and the main rotor. The out- 
reeling and testing was discontinued as unsafe. Thus the effect of 
side slip for the max length of static line was not tested. 
It was also concluded that reeling in the D-bag from its full length at 
door upper frame level would not be safe. 
 
On the next flight (test #3) this was re tested: a single static line was 
secured so (shortened) that it could in no case reach the main rotor. 
When reeling out the SL, the D-bag occasionally made a circle 
hitting the ASF’s lower part (video archived in UTJR flight test office). 
This, in combination with the previous observation in sideslip, was 
considered  unacceptable.  Furthermore,  the  ASF  has  plastic  air 
scoops, which would probably have been damaged in repeated 
operations. After this the testing with NHI’s anchor line was 
discontinued. No benefit was foreseen from its usage, but the static 
line behaviour became unpredictable and the risks were elevated 
compared to the floor attachment. 
4 static lines 
below the spon- 
son 
 
N/A 
 
Not tested due to a single static line’s unacceptable behaviour. 
4 static lines 
above the spon- 
son 
 
N/A 
 
Not tested due to a single static line’s unacceptable behaviour. 
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As a conclusion of the test item number 2, the testing with NHI’s anchor line was discontinued 
as potentially unsafe and because it did not provide any benefits for the T-10 system usage 
compared to the floor mounted anchor line. The PASI-2 anchor line was also rejected as it 
did not provide any benefits compared to PASI-1 and increased the unrest of the static lines 
in slipstream. The behaviour of the static lines was satisfactory with the PASI-1 anchor and 
the testing was continued with it. The airspeed regime was limited to 50-80 KIAS (~90-
150 km/h). Any lower airspeed increased the static lines instability. Low airspeeds were not 
desirable for the jumpers due to longer parachute opening times, increasing risks for a given 
exit height.
4.2.3 Test #3: Dummy drops
A total of 16 dummy drops were made during a single sortie consisting of four loads, i.e. 
four take-offs and landings. For test details, see Appendix 6 (Table 11, item #3) and master 
test matrix test points #3 and #4 in Appendix 9. The first eight dummy drops were made 
one by one, reeling the SL in after each drop. The airspeeds were 50, 60, 70 and 80 KIAS 
and the altitude 3000ft AGL. Two drops were made from each of the airspeeds. The last 
eight drops were made in sticks of four dummies, airspeeds being 60 and 80 KIAS and the 
drop altitude 1000 ft AGL.
Working with the 100 kg dummies was quite hard in the cabin of only 158 cm ceiling 
height even for two jumpmasters. Possibly due to this, the second dummy hit the cabin 
boarding step, causing a 30x50mm dent and buckling of the step’s longitudinal outer frame 
(Service Request reference: SR 1–7914270). This was however a minor incident and purely 
test setup related. All the dummies behaved in a stable manner after exit. The minimum 
separation with the right sponson during exits was 20 cm. All the static lines stabilised below 
the sponson and behaved well as on the previous sortie with PASI-1 anchor line.
As a conclusion, the test item was successfully passed and the campaign continued with 
paratroopers, maintaining the test airspeed range of 50-80 KIAS.
4.2.4 Test #4: Paratrooper jumps
A total of 28 paratrooper jumps were made on one sortie consisting of three loads. For sortie 
details, see Appendix 6 (Table 11, item #4) and the master test matrix test points #7 and 
#8 in Appendix 9. The cabin loading with a total of 13 cabin occupants, parachutes on is 
illustrated with Figure 23 as an example. 
The first four jumps were made individually from a seated position and only one jumper 
connected to the anchor line at a time in accordance with the incremental approach 
principle and the risk mitigation. The seated exit position reduced variables and made it 
more probable that the static lines would safely stabilise under the sponson instead of above 
it. In the seated exit position the jumper was sitting in the left (forward) side of the cabin 
door edge, facing directly to the side, feet hanging outside the cabin boarding step and hands 
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beside thighs (Figure 24, step 1). The subsequent jumps were made from a standing position 
from the left side of the door, with left foot on the door edge and left hand taking support 
of the left door frame (Figure 25). The first ten jumps were made individually, one per jump 
run (Table 5, test points 1-10) and with only one jumper connected to the anchor line at a 
time. The subsequent jumps were made in sticks of two or four jumpers (Table 5, test points 
11-15). Figure 26 visualises the exit procedure. 
The parachuting drop light (PDL, Figure 8) was used from the cockpit as per its design and 
purpose, but for information only. The jump orders were given via the intercom.
The test points and the observations for the three loads are listed in Table 5.
Figure 23. The loading of 13 cabin occupants including: 9 jumpers, 2 jumpmasters, an 
FTE and the loadmaster (behind the camera). Situation forward of the cabin 
door is seen on the left aft of the cabin door on the right
Table 5. Test points and observations for the paratrooper jumps (test item #4)
 
 
Test 
point # # of load 
Airspeed 
(KIAS) 
Number of 
jumpers 
Method of 
exit Observations 
1 
1 
50 1 sitting OK 
2 60 1 sitting OK. See Figure 24   
3 70 1 sitting OK 
4 80 1 sitting OK 
5 50 1 standing OK. See Figure 25   
6 60 1 standing OK 
7 65 1 standing OK. 
8 80 1 standing OK. Static line contacted the front edge of the sponson. 
9 80 1 standing OK. 
10 
2 
60 1 standing OK. 
11 70 4 standing OK. H/C climbed briefly at +100 fpm (ALT hold on) 
12 80 4 standing OK 
13 
3 
60 2 standing OK 
14 50 4 
standing OK. One static line stabilized against the  
right POS light −> no issues with retraction 
of static lines. 
15 60 4 standing See Figure 26   
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Figure 24.  A jumper’s exit at 60 KIAS from a seated position. In the readiness position 
(step 1) the jumper was sitting on the cabin floor facing directly to the side. 
The feet were hanging outside and hands beside thighs on the door edge. 
After exit the static line first contacted the middle of the boarding step, then 
stabilised against the bar between the step and the sponson as seen in step 
#6 on the bottom right
Figure 25.  A jumper’s exit at 50 KIAS from a standing position. In the readiness position 
(step 1) the jumper was standing on the left side of the door left foot forward. 
After jump the static line stabilised against the bar between the step and the 
sponson, contacting also the deflector bar
 
 
 
1  2  3  
4  5  6  
   
 
  
 
 
 
1  2  3  
4  5  6  
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Figure 26.  A stick of four jumpers exit at 60 KIAS from a standing position. The top-left 
picture shows the crowded readiness position. The series from top-middle to 
bottom-right (steps 2–6) shows the exit of the last jumper of the stick and 
how the four static lines stabilise below the sponson, contacting also the def-
lector bar
Figure 27.  Retraction of four static lines by jumpmaster #1 at 60 KIAS
In addition to what is noted in Table 5, the following observations were made (collected 
from the Post Flight Report 6/2012 [3]:
	 •	 All	 the	planned	 jumps	 could	be	made	fluently	 and	 in	 a	 controlled	manner.	The	
jumpers did not report anything that would restrict the normal paratrooper exit 
procedure. The jumpers were aware of the sponson behind the door, but at these 
airspeeds (50-80 knots) it did not create a need for any specific exit technique. It 
was also reported that the NH90 did not induce a non-conventional or adverse 
slipstream that would have affected the exits.
 
 
1  2  3  
4  5  6  
       
 
1  2  3  
4  5  6  
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	 •	 The	MC1-1C	static	lines	had	slightly	larger	snap	hooks	than	those	of	the	T-10Bs	(see	
Appendix 4’s Figure 31). Connecting and disconnecting the MC1-1C snap hooks 
to the PASI-1’s angled D-ring (Capewell 101406, NPF 61A665) was awkward and 
slow for the jumpmaster. For the T-10Bs this was not a problem due to smaller snap 
hooks.
	 •	 With	four	jumper	sticks	the	exit	positioning	was	somewhat	tight,	making	it	difficult	
but possible for the JM2 to inspect the gear of the last jumper. This was already 
indicated by the ground tests. In spite of this, the jumpmasters commented that it 
would be feasible to conduct T-10 operations from the NH90 with one jumpmaster 
only. That would also provide more room for the jumpers in the cabin. 
	 •	 The	cabin	occupants	reported	that	from	the	cabin	space	point	of	view	it	was	not	
necessary to turn the loadmaster’s seat against the wall (as all the other seats) from 
its normal position, which is facing forward.
	 •	 The	ICS	leads	and	harness	attachment	straps	got	easily	entangled	with	each	other.	
The LMs and the JMs required an ICS extension lead, which should be connected 
to the MSUs behind the door line. The MSUs are preferred for the LM and JMs 
to hear the external radio traffic (not possible via the SSUs). The LM shall in any 
case be connected to the MSU3’s hardwired back-up connector in case of an ICS 
malfunction.
	 •	 The	 44	 drops	made	 during	 the	 test	 items	 #3	 and	 #4	 abraded	 one	 layer	 of	 duct	
tape partly away from the boarding step. The static lines’ contact points are seen 
in Figure 24’s steps 5 and 6. The static lines also slightly abraded the sponson’s and 
boarding step’s paint which was acceptable. No observable abrasion of the static 
lines was noted. 
	 •	 At	 these	 airspeeds	 the	 occasional	 contact	 between	 the	 static	 lines	 and	 the	 right	
position light was very benign. This did not raise any concerns as of the position 
lights integrity during T-10 parachuting operations.
	 •	 Retraction	of	the	static	lines	was	straightforward	and	easy	for	the	jumpmaster.	The	
procedure is illustrated in Figure 27.
	 •	 The	Parachuting	Drop	Light	“jump”	tone	with	green	light	was	not	audible	inside	
the cabin in flight.
	 •	 No	testing	with	weapons	or	rucksacks	was	made	due	to	time	constraints.
	 •	 The	 right	 side	 Chaff	 and	 Flare	 Dispenser	 is	 located	 so	 that	 if	 operated	 during	
parachuting operations, it would endanger the exiting jumpers.
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The static lines’ good behaviour was substantiated already during the dummy drops (Chapter 
4.2.3). However, as the static lines’ dynamic behaviour was the main unknown during the 
test planning, a limited comparison between the analytical predictions and the actual flight 
test observations was made. These results can potentially be utilised in future planning of 
similar tests. The static line’s dynamic behaviour during and after parachutist separation is 
discussed in Appendix 11.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a conclusion, parachuting from the NH90 right cabin door at 50-80 KIAS using the 
T-10B/MC1-1C static line parachute systems was easy for the paratroopers, safe for the 
helicopter and readily controllable for the jumpmasters. With the used setup, the dynamic 
behaviour of the T-10 static lines was predictable and uneventful. The NH90 TTH TFIA 
helicopter equipped with the deflector bar, Patria’s floor protection panels, PASI-1 anchor 
line and tape protection at the right cabin door edge was found suitable for T-10 static line 
parachuting operations within the scope of the test (Chapter 1.1). 
For the configuration mentioned in the paragraph above, the following aircraft related 
operating limitations are proposed by the test team: 
 1. Allowed exit airspeed range: 50-80 KIAS;
 2. Maximum jumper weight: 150 kg;
 3. Landing gear shall be retracted during jumping;
 4. The right search light shall be retracted during jumping;
 5. With rucksacks the last group of four jumpers to exit shall not sit in the last two 
rows of seats in the cabin;
 6. With rucksacks only two jumpers shall be sitting or standing at the cabin door edge 
at the same time;
 7. Parachuting is not allowed with static lines connected to the ceiling anchor cables.
The first limitation is based on the observed static line behaviour in slipstream (Chapter 
4.2.2). The second is based on the maximum design load used to dimension the parachuting 
kit and the PASI-anchor (Chapter 2.4). The third and fourth limitations are based on the 
risk analysis to avoid the static line entanglement and damage to H/C (Appendix 10). The 
fifth and the sixth limitation are deducted from centre-of-gravity calculations (Appendix 8). 
The last limitation comes from the test results (Chapter 4.2.2).
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The test team’s recommendation for the exit airspeed is 65 KIAS (120 km/h) as the best 
compromise between the parachute opening speed and the static lines’ behaviour. The 
recommended exit method is to leap out from the left (nose) side of the right cabin door to 
minimise risks for contact with the sponson.
The Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation, version 1 (PASI-1) installed in 
accordance with Figure 11 and Appendix 4’s Figure 34 was found suitable for its intended 
purpose. However, the small size of the snap hook attachment ring should be rectified by 
changing bigger D-rings to PASI-1 instead of Ring D, angled (Capewell 101406, NPF 
61A665). The load bearing capability of the new D rings shall be at least 5000 lbs and the 
total functional length of the PASI-1 shall not change.
The used method of taping the door edge with a combination of aluminium and duct tape 
was found as a suitable mean to protect the static lines from excessive abrasion. This kind 
of method was also instructed in [32, p. 17–9]. This was finally the only tape protection 
considered necessary for routine static line operations with the Finnish variant NH90.
The fit of the parachuting system’s deflector bar’s two middle attachment points were 
excessively tight, possibly due to paint layers. It was considered questionable whether 
the attachment points’ integrity would endure repeated removals and installations with a 
standard 200g maintenance hammer. Until this issue has been rectified, the number of 
removals and installations of the bar should obviously be kept to the minimum.
No specific recommendation concerning the seating configuration was made. The only 
important point was to leave the right cabin door area clear, which was self-evident and can 
only be realised with a maximum of 15 installed troop seats (in the Finnish configuration).
By the test team’s judgment the occasional contact of the static lines with the right position 
light was so benign that it did not cause any real structural risk for the integrity of the 
position light. Thus no further actions concerning this are foreseen when using the PASI-1 
anchor.
The effect of atmospheric turbulence was considered not a factor from the safety point of 
view. In any case the wind limitation of 7 m/s for static line parachuting training prevent 
any significant turbulence at the jump altitudes.
It was concluded that if the D-bags got stuck during retraction (for example to the start fuel 
drain pipe), the JM should give some slack and try again. The fluttering movement would 
most probably guide the D-bag via another route and prevent bending of the drain pipe. 
The Parachuting Drop Light (PDL) was not necessary for static line operations at least 
during day time, as the relevant information between cockpit and cabin could be 
conveniently transferred by ICS and hand signals. The operation logic of PDL’s audio tone 
is in contradiction with other FDF aircraft, but as the audio tone was not audible in flight, 
this did not have a significant effect.
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Even though the need to use chaff and flares for self-protection during parachuting operations 
is unlikely, it needs to be instructed that the use of Chaff and Flare Dispenser is not possible 
from the right side during jumping.
The risk analysis and mitigation actions predicted well the actual outcome. Especially the 
introduction of the floor attached anchor line proved to be a good decision for testing and 
operation with the T-10 system. With another parachute system with much shorter static 
lines the use of the NHI’s ceiling mounted anchor lines could be possible. However, with the 
T-10 system the use of the ceiling mounted anchor lines was considered unsafe.
T-10 parachuting operations with personal weapons or rucksacks were not tested due to 
time constraints. The use of the NH90 helicopter with the T-10 parachuting system in 
combination with personal weapons and rucksacks as well as material dropping should 
be investigated. Also the use of other types of parachutes than the T-10 should be tested. 
Discussions with the authority are required to define what kind of substantiation is needed 
for operational release.
The use of the NH90’s rear ramp for static line operations should be investigated as soon 
as the complete removal-installation instructions for the rear ramp and hatch are available. 
This could potentially enable using greater exit airspeeds and make moving in the cabin and 
material dropping easier than with the right cabin door exit solution.
The NHI’ calculated estimations of the static lines’ behaviour seemed to predict well the 
real characteristics in flight for airspeed range of 50 to 80 knots, as detailed in Appendix 11. 
However, the calculations could not predict all the details of the static lines dynamics, such 
as the trim position high amplitude rotation at 40 knots and the flutter in trim position at all 
airspeeds. Only the “Start” and “Trim” positions could be verified, as the “Max” or highest 
up-swing position was in limited by the sponson in the test setup. Due to different initial 
conditions in the calculation and the actual test, some assumptions had to be made. These 
are detailed in Appendix 11.
As a final conclusion the test team considered the NH90, equipped as mentioned above, 
to meet both the user and the authority requirements (see Chapter 3) concerning the T-10 
static line parachuting operations. However, the official approval process needs to address 
and decide on the completeness of the presented substantiation before the capability is 
released to service.
6. SUMMARY
This study summarises the analyses and tests conducted to introduce the T-10 static line 
parachuting capability to the Finnish Defence Forces’ NH90 helicopter. The main research 
question “By which procedures and limitations can the NH90 helicopter be used for static line 
parachutist training with T-10B/MC1-1C parachutes?” can now be answered. By flight testing, 
supported by analysis and literary study it is shown that the NH90 can safely be used for 
static line parachuting training with T-10B/MC1-1C equipment, taking into account the 
scope mentioned in Chapter 1.1 and the procedures and limitations presented in Chapter 
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5. Most importantly, the static lines anchor point should be on the cabin floor level and the 
airspeed range 50–80 knots for safe parachuting operations from the right cabin door.
The first sub question: “What are the NH90 helicopter and the T-10B/MC1-1C parachute 
systems?” is answered in Chapter 2. The chapter also describes the modifications for the 
helicopter and the manufacturer’s Parachuting Kit to enable safe and controlled conduct of 
operations. 
The second sub question: “What are the relevant user and authority requirements for the NH90 
static line parachuting system and capability?” is answered in Chapter 3. User requirements 
are defined by the end user Utti Jaeger Regiment. Airworthiness aspects are governed by the 
Finnish Military Aviation Authority via regulations and advisories, of which the relevant 
items are presented in Chapter 3. 
The third sub question: “How does the static line parachuting system, as incorporated in the 
NH90 helicopter, behave during flight tests and what are the possible areas requiring further 
development?” is answered in Chapter 4.2. In short, the NHI’s standard Parachuting Kit’s 
cabin ceiling mounted guidance cables were considered as unsafe anchor lines for the T-10 
system. This was due to the ceiling attached static lines’ unacceptable behaviour in slipstream. 
However, the floor mounted PASI prototype anchor line was a usable solution for the T-10 
static line operations. In the flight test setup the only items requiring modification were the 
PASI-1 prototype anchor’s D-rings for static lines’ attachment. The D-rings needed to be 
changed to larger ones to facilitate use of the MC1-1C snap hooks.
Some proposals for future testing are presented in Chapter 5. One of the most important 
points is the usability of the rear ramp for parachuting operations, with the ramp and hatch 
removed. 
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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
@ “at”
# “number”
°C	 Degrees	Celsius
A/C Aircraft
AGL Above Ground Level
Aircraft A machine that is able to fly by gaining support from the air. [35] The 
word aircraft can mean for example a fixed wing aeroplane, a helicopter 
or a hot air balloon.
ALT (hold) An autopilot mode for automatic barometric flight altitude hold.
AM Asennusmääräys  (“Installation order” for temporary solutions)
ASF Anti-sand filter (of the engine air intake)
ATT Attitude hold based flight control mode of the NH90 Flight Control 
system Authority In  this  case  the  Finnish  Military  Aviation  Authority 
(FIMAA),  a  military  aviation  regulatory  unit  associated with the Air 
Force Headquarters [1].
CFD Chaff and Flare Dispenser or Computational fluid dynamics
CGx Longitudinal centre of gravity
CGy Lateral centre of gravity
Conscript A person undergoing his/her compulsory national military service
CoG Centre of Gravity
CoS Coefficient of Safety, number given by break-up or limit load  divided 
by the maximum  applied  load  (the design load)
CP Control Panel
D-bag Deployment bag
e.g. For example (in Latin: “exemplī grātiā”)
EDA European Defence Agency
Exit weight The  all-up-weight  of  the  jumper  including  all  personal equipment 
and the parachute assembly
F_AL Force on the anchor line
F_RING Force on the floor attachment ring
F_SL Force on the static line
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAR-29 Federal Aviation Regulation, part 29 (for transport category rotorcraft)
FDF Finnish Defence Forces
FIMAA Finnish Military Aviation Authority
FINAF Finnish Air Force
FINAF AMC Finnish Air Force Air Materiel Command
FM Field Manual (US) or Flight Manual
FOC Final Operational Configuration
ft Foot/feet, 1 ft = 0.3048m
FTE Flight Test Engineer
FWD Forward
H/C helicopter
APPENDIX 1
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HD High Definition
hPa Hecto-Pascals, 1 hPa = 100 Pascals or 0.001 bars
IAS Indicated airspeed (seen on cockpit instruments)
ICS Intercom system
ID Identification (number/code)
IETP Interactive Electronic Technical Publication
in Inch = 2.54 cm
IOC+ Improved Operational Configuration
IR Infra-red
JM Jumpmaster
KIAS Indicated airspeed in knots
kN Kilo-Newton = 1000 Newtons
kt (or kts) Knot(s), 1 knot = 1.852 km/h
kW kilo-Watt
lb (or lbs) Pounds, 1 lb = 0.4536 kg
LG Landing Gear
LH Left hand side
LLOS Laatu- ja lentokelpoisuusosasto / Quality and Airworthiness Division of 
the FINAF AMC
LM Loadmaster
local Local time, in this case the Finnish summer time, UTC+3, unless 
otherwise indicated
MAUW Max All-up weight
mi Statute mile(s). 1 mi = 1.609 km
MLG Main Landing Gear
MOD Ministry of Defence
mph Miles per hour. 1 mph = 1.609 km/h
MPKK Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu
MR Main rotor (of a helicopter)
MSU Master Station Unit, control box of the NH90 intercom system
NAHEMA Nato Helicopter Management Agency
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU National Defence University
NHI NHIndustries, NH90 supplier
NH90 “Nato Helicopter for the 90s”
OAT Outside Air Temperature
OHCP Overhead control panel (in the NH90 cockpit)
P/N Part Number
Paratrooper A  soldier  who  is  trained  to  enter  combat  zones  by parachuting from 
aircraft [37]
PASI Prototype Anchor for Static line Implementation (designed and 
manufactured by UTJR)
PDL Parachuting Drop Light
PFR Post Flight Report
PI/P Product Investment / Production
POS Position
QNH Pressure setting for altitude above mean sea level
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RBL Requirement of Type Specification
RFQ Request for Quotation
RH Right hand (side)
RWR Radar Warning Receiver
SCT Scattered clouds, 4/8 of the sky or less
SL Static Line 
Slipstream The region of airflow close to the helicopter’s fuselage affected by its 
movement or rotor’s wake
Sponson (for the NH90) A projection from the side of the fuselage, housing 
primarily the main landing gear
SR Service Request (to the NHI support organisation)
SSOC Senior Staff Officer Course
SSU Secondary  Station  Unit,  the  passengers  interface  to  the NH90’s 
intercom system
Stick A group of paratroopers to exit with short intervals on the same jump 
run
SX16 A powerful external search light
T-10 / MC1 Round  troop  military  parachute.  MC1  is  the  steerable version of the 
T-10
TBC To Be Confirmed (later)
TFIA Transport Finnish Army (an NH90 TTH variant)
TMT “Lentoteknillinen muutos- ja tiedotusjärjestelmä” – FDF’s airborne 
systems related technical change and information data system
TN Technical Note
TOW Take-off weight
TPSA Requirement of Type Specification
TS Type Specification
TTH Tactical Transport Helicopter
UH Utility Helicopter
US United States (of America)
UTJR Utti Jaeger Regiment
VFR Visual Flight Rules
Vis Visibility
VM Verification Method
WTR Winch Man Trim
XTP Experimental Test Pilot
YT-ohje Yhteistoimintaohje,  a  procedure  for  co-operation  (here between the 
aircrew and the parachutists)
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EXTRACT FORM THE NH90 ACQUISITION CONTRACT
Figure 28.    Extract from the FDF NH90 acquisition contract’s Appendix 2 [33]: requirements 
RBL-925 and RBL-926 relating to the parachuting capability. Contractual 
Verification Method 9 means that the qualification for the Finnish NH90 
variant (TFIA) is based on an already existing qualification. In this case the 
NAHEMA qualification for the TTH. The verification method “9” is specified 
in brackets with numbers that have the following explanations: 1 = Design 
documents, 3c = Demonstration on material – Moc-ups, 4 = Flight tests, 7 
= Documentation for aircrew (Flight Manual etc). Together the requirement 
RBL-926 and MOC4 as the verification method indicate that flight testing 
is required for the contractual substantiation of the requirement (and the 
capability)
APPENDIX 2
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APPENDIX 3
EXTRACT FROM THE NH90 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE
Below are two extracts  (see Figure 29 and Figure 30) of the NH90 program’s Security 
Classification Guide [28], which is attachment 1 for the annex K (unclassified) of the 
NH90 PI/P Contract (NH90 acquisition contract) between the NAHEMA and the NHI.
Figure 29. Extract from page 1/12, clarifying the classification abbreviations
Figure 30.    Extract from page 6/12 showing that the parachuting system is classified as 
“NU” = NATO Unclassified which is the lowest classification possible and in 
this case corresponds to “JULKINEN” in Finland
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APPENDIX 4
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE TEST ITEMS
Table 6. T-10B / MC1-1C main characteristics [7; 8]
Table 7. T-10 main components’ part numbers  [7; 8; 34]
Figure 31.    The snap hooks used during the tests. On the left the T-10B snap hook (P/N: 
MS 70120, proof load 1750 lbs/794 kg/7.8 kN) and on the right the MC1-1C 
snap hook (P/N: 11–1–6991–1, 100% proof load 1750 lbs/794 kg/7.8 kN, 
tensile strength 8000 lbs/3600 kg/35.6kN) [25, p. 3–21]. The 11–1–6991–1 
snap hook is generally simpler to use as it does not need a safety pin, unli-
ke the earlier MS 70120 snap hook. However, the construction makes the 
11–1–6991–1 slightly larger in dimensions.
Parameter Value 
Diameter 35 feet (10.7 m) nominal, 25.7 feet (7.8 m) inflated 
Gore (canopy) material T-10B: 1.1 oz. PIA-C-7020, type I ripstop nylon parachute cloth 
MC1-1C: 1.12 oz PIA-C-44378, F-111 ripstop parachute nylon 
Number of suspension lines 30 
Suspension line material Type II nylon cord, PIA-C-5040, 400 lb (181.8 kg) tensile strength 
Length of suspension line T-10B: 7.8m / MC1-1C: 6.7m connector to lower lateral band 
Maximum Weight Capacity 163 kg (360 lbs) 
Complete assembly weight 14 kg (31 lbs) 
Maximum jump wind speed 14 knots (7 m/s), in Finland, [34] 
Descent rate T-10B: Avg 6.7 m/s (22 ft/sec), MC1-1C: avg. 5.5 m/s (18 ft/sec) 
Minimum deployment altitude 500 ft (152 m) 
Maximum deployment speed 150 knots (278 km/h) 
Service life 16.5 years (in Finland, [34]) 
 
T-10B (P/N: 11-1-564-1) MC1-1C (P/N: 11-1-900-2) 
Canopy 11-1-1501-1 Canopy 11-1-1501-3 
Pack 62J434 Pack 62J4342 
D-bag 56D6276 D-bag (the same as for T-10B) 
Static line 56D6481 Static line 55D6481 
Harness 11-1-2143-1 Harness (the same as for T-10B) 
Riser 11-1-2149-2 Riser (the same as for T-10B) 
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Table 8. NH90 general characteristics and performance values ([36] unless noted 
otherwise)
    
Crew minimum 1 pilot + 1 crew member, normally 2 pilots + 1 
loadmaster [20] 
Capacity 16 seated troops or 12 medevac stretchers or 2 NATO pal- 
lets or approximately 3000 kg internal or external load. 
Length 16.13 m (52 ft 11 in) 
Rotor diameter 16.30 m (53 ft 6 in) 
Height 5.23 m (17 ft 2 in), nominal cabin height 1.58 m (5 ft 2 in) 
max take-off weight 11000 kg (24250 lb) [20] 
Powerplant 2 × Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322-01/9 turboshaft, ap- 
prox   1400 kW (  1900 shp) each at max continuous power 
Maximum speed (cruise) 300 km/h (162 knots, 186 mph) 
Range (with internal fuel) 800 km, 497 mi 
Service ceiling 6000 m (20000 ft) 
Rate of climb (max weight, sea level) 8 m/s (1574 ft/m) 
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Figure 32. The NH90 TTH three view diagram: principal dimensions in millimetres.
 The cabin doorway on both sides is 1.6 metres wide and 1.5 metres high [19]
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Figure 33.  The location of the Cable Kit: Anchor cable, support brackets and op tional 
rubber stops mounted on interface brackets [Ref 1]
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Table 9.       NH90 Parachuting System part numbers and weights [14]. As an exception to 
the convention of the study, here commas are used as the decimal separators 
instead of dots.
Table 10. Prototype anchor line components [25; 26]
 
Item / name 
 
P/N Strength (lbs) 
Strength 
(kg) 
 
Purpose 
 
Notes 
Quick Release 
Cargo Ring (dou- 
ble stub ring, for 
Douglas type 
rails) 
 
47981-10 
NSN: 5340- 
01-560-3313 
 
 
 
5000 
 
 
 
2268 
 
 
Attachment of the 
anchor line to floor 
 
 
MFG: ANCRA INTER- 
NATIONAL LLC 
Snap, parachute 
chest type pack 
 
MS70121-1 
 
5000 
 
2268 Connection to cargo rings 
 
 
Type-7 webbing 
(”belt”) 
 
Ty-8, PIA-W- 
4088 
 
6000 
 
2722 
 
Anchor line webbing 
1 23/32” width (44 mm). 
Commonly used in para- 
chute harnesses 
 
Ring, D angled 
Capewell 
101406, NPF 
61A665 
 
5000 
 
2268 
attachment of the 
static line to anchor 
line 
Optionally used instead 
of Ring, D (as in Figure 
12) 
 
 
Ring, D 
 
 
11-1-485 
 
 
5000 
 
 
2268 
 
attachment of the 
static line to anchor 
line 
T-10B/MC1-1C harness 
assembly component 
Optionally used instead 
of Ring, D angled 
 
Harness thread 
  > 6000 
lbs 
 
> 2760 
kg 
Attachment of the 
components by sew- 
ing 
 
The tensile strength of a 
single thread is 12 kg 
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Figure 34.    Strength and dimensioning calculations of the “PASI”-belt’s attachment to 
the cabin floor. Load on the SL = load on PASI = load on the floor attachment 
point = 11.76kN in the worst (design) case. The PASI belt has the minimum 
ten- sile strength of 22.3 kN, which provides a CoS of at least 1.9 against the 
design load. Floor drawing is from [5]
 
60
APPENDIX 5
FINAF AMC'S INSTALLATION ORDERS FOR FLIGHT TESTS
Figure 35.  lnstallation order "AM/132/NH" for PASI and test related modifications
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Figure 36.  lnstallation order "AM/133/NH" for the use of the rescue parachutes
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Figure 37.  Installation order "AM/109/YL" for the Gabin Safety Harness.
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GENERAL TEST CONDITIONS
Table 11. General test conditions for each sortie
Table 12. Part numbers for some test relevant aircraft items
Table 13. The essential anthropometric data of the test personnel (without any 
equipment)
APPENDIX 6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test 
# 
 
 
 
Date 
(2012) 
 
 
 
A/C 
(NH) 
 
 
 
Config & 
Equipment 
 
 
 
 
Weight&CoG 
 
Fuel 
(take- 
off, 
kg) 
QNH 
/ OAT 
/ Wind 
/ Visibility 
/ Clouds, 
WX 
 
Landing 
/Flight 
Time 
(hh:mm, 
local) 
 
 
 
 
Other 
 
1 
 
17.9. 
 
209 
Ground test. An- 
chor lines PASI-1 
& 2 and NHI 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
18.9. 
 
 
 
209 
LG UP, ASF, no 
IR suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1, -2, and 
NHI 
 
TOW: 9400 kg 
CGx:7.06 m 
CGy: 0.02 m 
 
 
 
1700 
1011 hPa 
/ +11°C, 
/ 190°,5kt, 
/ 16 km 
/ few 300ft 
 
 
11:16 
/ 1:57 
 
40 KIAS: 
pitch +8° 
80 KIAS: 
pitch +2° 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
20.9. 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
LG UP, ASF, no IR 
suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1 
 
 
TOW: 9600 kg 
CoG within FM 
limits 
 
 
 
 
1500 
1011 hPa 
/ +13° 
/ 200°, 8kt 
/ vis 50 km 
/ SCT 
3500ft 
 
 
 
11:45 
/ 1:36 
4 loads 
with 4 
dummies 
each = 16 
dummy 
drops total 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
20.9. 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
LG UP, ASF, no IR 
suppressor, RH 
cabin door open, 
PASI-1 
 
 
TOW:10100kg 
CGx:7.05 m 
CGy: 0.02 m 
 
 
 
 
1500 
1011 hPa 
/ +13° 
/ 200°, 8kt 
/ vis 50 km 
/ SCT 
3500ft 
 
 
 
15:47 
/ 0:54 
 
3 loads, 
9+9+10 
jumpers = 
28 jumps 
 
Troop seat P/N: S252M20A1005 [12, p. 4] 
Floor protection panels (Patria) P/N: PNH252300010 [5, p. 2] 
Boarding step (group) P/N: S533M0060051 [23, p. 9] 
 
Role Height (cm) Weight (kg) 
Jumpmaster 1 173 75 
Jumpmaster 2 180 90 
Loadmaster 170 75 
The tallest paratrooper 196 90 
The shortest paratrooper 175 70 
Paratrooper average 180 75 
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APPENDIX 7
TEST LIMITATIONS
The reason for each limitation is clarified in brackets.
 1.   Absolute weather minima for flight testing: visibility 3km / cloud base 500ft 
AGL (FDF’s NH90 maintenance flight test guide, [9]);
 2.   The maximum airspeed for static line jumping:
  o   80 KIAS for floor attachment (due to design assumptions [15]);
  o   60 KIAS for ceiling anchor cable attachment (due to analysis results [10]).
 3.    The minimum airspeed for static line jumping: 40 KIAS (own judgment, less risk 
for SL bounce up, [2]);
 4. Maximum ground wind speed for dropping parachutists: 14 knots (FDF 
regulations. Also test recommendation for dummy drops);
 5.    Maximum equipped jumper’s all-up-weight: 150 kg (design assumption [15]);
 6.    Minimum drop altitude for parachutists: 1500 ft AGL [32];
 7.    Minimum drop altitude for test dummies: 300 ft AGL (own judgment  adequate 
ground clearance for T-10 opening);
 8.   Landing gear shall be retracted (up) during static line jumping (less risk for SL 
entanglement);
 9.   Intentional quick stop, autorotation and hovering manoeuvres at an airspeed less 
than 30 KIAS are prohibited with static lines out on the door (own judgment, 
risk for SL vs. rotor contact);
 10.  The right search light shall be retracted during jumping activity (risk for SL 
entangle- ment);
 11.  Turbulence at the exit altitude shall be low (NHI draft test plan limitation);
 12.  No sideslip when dropping dummies or parachutists (less risk for adverse static 
line behaviour);
 13.  With rucksacks the last four jumpers to exit shall not sit in the last two rows of seats 
in the cabin (CoG calculations, longitudinal aft limit);
 14.  With rucksacks only two jumpers shall be sitting or standing at the cabin door edge 
at the same time (CoG calculations, lateral limit);
 15.  The maximum allowed vertical position for the static line during jumping (up-
swing) is the top of the helicopter tail boom (own judgment for safe margin vs. 
MR).
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MASS AND BALANCE CALCULATIONS
Some example results are given below presuming 1700 kg of fuel and all occupants weighing
100 kg (a realistic average value for parachutists without rucksacks). In the following figures, 
the precise NH90 centre-of-gravity envelopes or CoG limits (longitudinal and lateral) have 
been omitted due to classification reasons.
	 •				 The	max	loading	is	12	jumpers	(@	100	kg),	two	jumpmasters	and	a	four	man	crew	
(Figure 38);
	 •						The	aft	CoG	limit	is	nearly	reached	(but	not	yet	crossed)	with	1700	kg	fuel,	if	the	
first three cabin seat rows (six seats) are empty and the remaining seats occupied 
(Figure 39);
				 •				 It	 is	 ok	 to	 have	 four	 jumpers	 at	 the	 most	 aft	 four	 seats	 and	 two	 jumpmasters	
inspecting them (with loadmaster at the cabin door);
				 •				 With	one	occupant	on	the	left	side	of	the	cabin	(JM),	two	on	the	right	(LM+JM)	
and four sitting in the right cabin door, the lateral CoG is well within limits (Figure 
40).
Reducing the amount of fuel provides more marginal to these cases. As a summary, if all 
occupants weigh on the average 100 kg, there is no practical case where the MAUW and 
CoG limits would be exceeded during these tests.
Below are some similarly calculated example values presuming 1800 kg of fuel, aircrew and 
jumpmasters weighing 100 kg and jumpers weighing 150 kg (with rucksacks):
				 •				 The	max	loading	is	8	jumpers	(@	150	kg),	two	jumpmasters	and	a	four	man	crew;
				 •				 The	aft	CoG	is	exceeded	if	the	last	four	remaining	jumpers	sit	at	the	most	aft	seats	
and the JMs walk to inspect them -> with rucksacks the last group of jumpers to exit 
shall not sit in the last two rows of seats in the cabin;
				 •				 The	lateral	CoG	is	exceeded	with	one	JM	on	the	left	side	of	the	cabin,	JM	+	LM	on	
the right side, two jumpers sitting at the right cabin boarding step and two standing 
immediately behind them -> not more than two jumpers @ 150 kg shall be sitting 
or standing at the cabin door edge at the same time.
APPENDIX 8
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Figure 38.  MAUW limiting: 12 jumpers (@ 100 kg), two jumpmasters, a four man crew 
and 1700 kg (850 kg +850 kg) of fuel. The CoG envelope of the NH90 is 
omitted from the graphs for classification reasons
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Figure 39.  Aft CoG limiting: the first three cabin seat rows (six seats) are empty and the 
remaining seats occupied. The CoG envelope of the NH90 is omitted from the 
graphs for classification reasons 
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Figure 40.  It is also allowed to have the last remaining four jumpers all at the right cabin 
door edge at the same time. At least one occupant has to sit on the left side 
of the cabin as a counterweight for lateral CoG 
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MASTER TEST MATRIX
Table 14. Master test matrix as written in the test plan[29]. The tests #5, #6, #9 and #10 
(drops with anchor line in the cabin ceiling) were eventually not done as un- 
safe with the T-10 static lines
APPENDIX 9
 
 
# 
 
 
Test item 
 
H/C Configu- 
ration & cargo 
 
 
Flight conditions 
 
Alti- 
tude 
(AGL) 
Cabin 
test 
person- 
nel 
 
# of 
drops 
 
 
Pass criteria 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Occupants’ actions: 
*before and during take off 
*before exit & during exit 
*in case of forced landing 
*in case of emergency jump 
* in case of chute opening in cabin 
* Check draft “YT-ohje” 
 
 
Anchor line on 
ceiling and on 
floor. 8 LH + 7 
RH seat conf. 
in the cabin. 
 
 
 
 
Ground test 
 
 
 
 
Ground 
test 
 
 
* LM 
* JM 
* up to 12 
parachut- 
ists fully 
geared up 
 
 
 
 
NA 
The positioning and transi- 
tions shall be such that: 
* the JM & LM can control the 
situation at all times. 
* There is no inherent risk of 
accidental chute opening in 
cabin in flight 
* H/C’s CoG limits are not 
violated 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
An “empty” static line’s behaviour ( 
one and four lines) in slipstream, 
including pulling it in 
* LG UP 
* Anchor line: 
1. on floor. 
2. on ceiling 
 
At least one T- 
10 static line 
with total 
length of 5.3 
m. 
 
 
 
* @ 40, 50, 60, 70, 
80 KIAS 
* sideslip -1, 0, +1 
ball at each speed 
 
 
 
 
 
300 ft 
 
 
 
 
*LM 
* JM 
* video 
 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
SL with either anchor line 
position: 
*No objectionable sporadic 
behaviour 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the floor 
one dummy per jump run 
 
 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
* 40, 60, 70, 80 
KIAS 
 
Notes: 
* 2 dummies from 
each airspeed 
* only one dummy 
connected to the 
anchor line at the 
time. 
* Parachutes for 
test crew 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3000ft 
 
 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
*Safe separation of the 
dummies 
*No objectionable behaviour 
of the static line(s) (esp. up 
swing towards MR) 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM 
* No objectionable behaviour 
of the anchor line 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the floor 
four dummies per jump run 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
 
* 60, 80 KIAS (TBC 
by expecience) 
 
Notes: 
* all four dummies 
dropped on one 
jump run 
 
 
 
 
1500ft 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
As above 
Items #5 and #6 are only be done if the clearance with the SL and the MR is estimated to be adequate based on tests #3 and #4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
Dropping dummies with anchor line 
on the ceiling 
one dummy per jump run 
 
 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
* 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
* 40, 50, 60 KIAS 
 
Notes: 
* At least 2 dum- 
mies from each 
airspeed 
Note: only one 
dummy connected 
to the anchor line 
at the time. 
* Parachutes for 
test crew 
 
 
 
 
 
≥ 
3000ft 
 
 
* LM 
(safety 
harness + 
para- 
chute) 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
 
6 
Dropping dummies anchor line on 
the ceiling 
four dummies per jump run 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
* 50, 60 KIAS (TBC 
by expecience) 
Note: all four 
dummies dropped 
 
1500 
ft 
* LM 
(safety 
harness + 
para- 
 
 
8 
 
 
As above 
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  * 4 dummies 
with T-10 type 
parachutes / 
load 
on one jump run  chute) 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
  
 
Select 2   3 most suitable airspeeds for dropping jumpers. Decide on how to proceed with ceiling mounted anchor line – margin to MR. 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the floor 
 
exit position sitting on the cabin 
door edge 
one jumper per jump run, different 
speed for each 
 
 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
*4–  12 
parachutists 
per load 
 
50, 60, 70, 80 
KIAS (based on 
previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 
 
 
 
 
1500 
ft AGL 
 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
*at least 4 
jumpers 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
*Safe separation of the 
jumpers 
*No objectionable behaviour 
of the SL (esp. up swing 
towards MR) 
* No objectionable contact 
with H/C structure 
* No snagging of the SL while 
pulling in by the JM 
* No objectionable behaviour 
of the anchor line 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the floor 
exit position standing on the 
cabin door edge 
2   4 jumpers per run. Interval 
TBD by jumpmaster 
 
* LG UP 
*FDF anchor 
line on the 
floor 
*4   12 para- 
chutists per 
load 
60 – 80 KIAS (2   3 
airspeeds based 
on previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 
 
 
 
1500 
ft AGL 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
# 9 and #10  – IF CONSIDERED SAFE AFTER DUMMY DROPS: 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the ceiling 
 
exit position sitting on the cabin 
door edge 
one jumper per jump run, 4 
jumpers 
 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
*4–12 para- 
chutists per 
load 
40   60 KIAS (2   3 
based on previous 
tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 
 
 
 
1500ft 
AGL 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Dropping parachutists with anchor 
line on the ceiling 
exit position standing on the 
cabin door edge/step 
2   4 jumpers per run. Interval 
TBD by jumpmaster 
 
* LG UP 
*Standard NHI 
anchor line on 
the ceiling 
*4–12 para- 
chutists per 
load 
40   60 KIAS (2   3 
airspeeds based 
on previous tests) 
 
Only those jumpers 
connected to the 
anchor line who 
are about to jump 
on that run 
 
 
 
 
1500 
ft AGL 
 
 
* LM 
* JM1 
* JM2 
* video 
* 12 
jumpers 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
As above 
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
–
– 
– 
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HAZARD LEVEL DETERMINATION
The risk analysis was done in accordance with the “hazard level determination” method 
originating from the United States Naval Air Systems Command [27]. The hazard levels 
were rated for severity and probability in accordance with the guidelines identified in Table 
15.
Table 15.    Test hazard levels
Applying the above guidelines to each test event provided the basis for making a risk 
assessment for each test event defined in the test matrix. Individual element risk categories 
were assigned using the residual risk matrix specified in Table 16.
Table 16.    Residual risk matrix
Notes: (1)  The determination of a test project whose residual risk assessment falls under I/C will require 
up front discussions with TCT (Test Coordination Team) prior to proceeding with the test 
program development.
  (2)  Assignment of Risk Category where residual risk falls under I/D or II/D will require up front 
discussions with the TCT to determine whether Risk Category A or B is applicable.
UA Unacceptable risk, project residual risk too high to proceed.
Risk Category C - Test or activities which present a significant risk to personnel, equipment or property, even 
after all precautionary/corrective actions are taken.
Risk Category B Test or activities which present a greater risk to personnel, equipment or property than normal 
operations. 
Risk Category A Test or activities which present no greater risk than normal operations.
Mishap Probability  Hazard Severity 
A Frequent: likely to occur imme- 
diately or within a 
short period of time. 
I Catastrophic: may cause death or 
aircraft loss. 
B Probable: probably will occur in 
time. 
II Critical:  may cause severe 
injury or major aircraft 
damage. 
C Occasional: may occur in time. III Marginal: may cause minor 
injury or minor aircraft 
damage. 
D Remote: unlikely to occur IV Negligible: will not result in injury 
or aircraft damage. 
 
Mishap 
 
Probability 
Hazard Severity 
I 
Catastrophic 
II 
Critical 
III 
Marginal 
IV 
Negligible 
A Frequent UA UA Risk Category C Risk Category B 
B Probable UA Risk Category C Risk Category C Risk Category A 
C Occasional Note 1 Risk Category C Risk Category B Risk Category A 
D Remote Note 2 Note 2 Risk Category A Risk Category A 
 
APPENDIX 10
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HAZARD ANALYSIS SUMMARY
The most significant hazards identified by the test team are summarized as follows:
Damage to H/C due to contact with static line or jumper after exit
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, damage to several possible items
Precautionary Measures:  Risk to be minimised by starting at a low airspeed (40 KIAS) and 
assessing the risk with increased airspeed. In case the POS light or other part disintegrates, 
abort mission and investigate damages. When pulling in the SLs by the JM, the LM shall 
be monitoring possible contact with fuselage. The right side search light under the sponson 
shall be retracted during parachuting.
Residual hazard level: C/III = Risk category B
Damage to composite structure due to D-bag contact after exit
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, up-swing against the fuselage. The inherent risk is considered 
low as there are no heavy (=metal) objects in that part of the static line or deployment bag 
that is hung outside the fuselage. Thus the impact pressure on any part of the fuselage is 
probably small even though the impact speed after up-swing could be high
Precautionary Measures: The use of low airspeeds on the first drops and increasing the 
airspeed with small steps, continuously monitoring the SL behaviour from inside the 
cabin and from the chase H/C.
Residual hazard level: C/III = category B
Damage to composite cabin floor due to snap hook contact after exit
Cause & effect: SL dynamics, probable damage to unprotected standard cabin floor 
with floor mounted anchor line.
Precautionary Measures: As the risk of damage is high due to normal snap hook behaviour 
(slamming against the floor as the SL tightens), the Patria floor protection panels must 
be used with the floor mounted anchor line. After this, the risk is very improbable.
Residual hazard level: D/IV =  risk category A
Parachutist or dummy entanglement to the SL after exit (a  “hang fire”) 
Cause & effect: Exit in a rolling movement or a packing error. Parachute fails to open, 
jumper does not separate from the SL.
Precautionary Measures: A knife to cut the SL shall be immediately available to JM 
and LM. The knife shall be immediately taken for readiness to cut the SL if circumstances 
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so mandate to save the H/C. Communication between the JM and the tangled jumper – it 
has to be  reminded  prior  test  to  all  jumpers  that  opening  the  reserve  parachute  is 
absolutely forbidden when tangled to SL! (a standard parachuting procedure). Jumpmaster is 
to instruct the crew to go for a careful landing, after the situation is stable. If the reserve 
parachute opens, the SL must be cut immediately (a standard parachuting procedure). The 
additional static lines have to be pulled into the cabin before entering hover.
Residual hazard level: D/III = Risk category A
Accidental opening of a parachute inside the cabin
Cause & effect: Careless movement in the cabin -> handle extracted and canopy opens. 
In the worst case the canopy slips out of the door taking the jumper and a considerable 
part of the fuselage with it. This is a very dangerous situation if let to happen.
Precautionary Measures: The risk is minimised by using experienced parachutists for test 
jumps and by briefing the procedure on how to move inside the cabin (“protect handles, 
move slowly, if you get stuck: inform JM etc). It is also briefed (normal parachuting 
procedure) that in case an opened chute is noticed, the closest person takes control of the 
chute, immediately warns others and the closest one to the door closes it. After that, no door 
opening is allowed before landing.
Residual hazard level: D/II = Risk category B
Contact of static line with main rotor
Cause & effect: This risk potentially exists with ceiling attachment of the static 
lines. If gotten stuck to the MR and if the SL or the snap hook would not fail, the anchor 
could be torn out from the cabin towards the MR. As such this would probably not be 
catastrophic, but if the anchor line would pull put other SLs and canopies, that could 
potentially end up in a loss of aircraft control and lives.
Precautionary Measures: With the first jumps using either attachment, the first drops are 
made with only with the floor mounted anchor line and only one static line in the anchor 
at any time. This minimises the damages should the SL tangle with MR. During the first 
drops from ceiling cable (if declared safe by the previous tests), only one SL attached to the 
cable at the time -> less risk in case SL gets stuck to the MR. Emergency rescue parachutes 
for all occupants on board to minimise the risks for personnel. Emergency escape to be 
practiced before flights.
Residual hazard level: D/II = Risk category B
SL/deployment bag entaglement during retraction after jump
Cause & effect: Although no obvious risk has been identified, it is possible that 
the static line’s deployment bag would get tangled before or during retraction. This risk is 
considered realistic if the static line stabilises below the sponson
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Precautionary Measures: An investigation was made with an NH90 on jacks, whether 
there were clear points for entanglement. When the landing gear was retracted, the only 
potential obstructions were the fuel system vent scoop and a thin engine start fuel vent 
line coming from the upper deck. No potential mechanism for the static line to jam the 
landing gear was seen.
As precautions: the landing gear has to be retracted when dropping jumpers, the static lines’ 
behaviour in slipstream will be checked during test item #2, before actual jumps, the LM 
shall monitor the static line behaviour when being retracted by the JM, near the landing 
site, a set of tyres shall be ready in case the LG extension still fails for some unknown 
reason. In case the static line anyway gets tangled after a jump, the JM shall try to remove 
it with all suitable means. Communication with LM is essential. If the static line cannot 
be retracted, all other lines shall be retracted and the LG extended for landing. The JM shall 
control the static line(s) until on the ground
Residual hazard level: B/IV = Risk category A
SUMMARY: The biggest risks in the analysis above belong to the risk category B, which is 
thus the overall test risk category. The risk category B means that the planned tests cause an 
increased risk which is higher than in normal service. The tests do not cause a considerable 
risk to materiel or personnel when all the mitigation actions are implemented.
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STATIC LINE UP-SWING WITH AIRSPEED
Although the risks related to the static line up-swing after jumper separation were eliminated 
using the floor attached anchor, a limited comparison of the analysis and results was made 
as interesting and for future reference. The NHI’s analysis of the static line’s dynamic 
behaviour in slipstream is visualised in Figure 10. The analysis has been made using a general 
aeromechanical simulation code named GENSIM [10].
Airspeeds of 50, 60 and 80 knots were selected for comparison as representative values of 
the tested airspeed envelope. The jumps were filmed from a chase helicopter located slightly 
aft of the test helicopter with a 50–100 meter separation. This created some parallax error 
which was taken into account by the error margins.
Only the “Start” and “Trim” positions of the static line were taken into consideration, as 
with the floor attachment the sponson prevented the static lines rising above H/C bottom 
surface level. Thus the comparison concerning the “Max” case would have been erroneous 
and meaningless.
Even when comparing the “Start” and “Trim” cases, some error may have been be caused 
by the different setups for the analysis and the tests. In the analysis, the static lines were 
mounted on the ceiling, whereas in the tests they were mounted on the floor. Based on 
the author’s experience on the flow dynamics around helicopter fuselages, this error was 
probably insignificant for the “Start” case and small/moderate for the “Trim” case. The only 
major variable (for a non-sideslip condition) was the downwash of the main rotor, and in 
forward flight case the downwash would be directed almost horizontally backwards, with a 
small deviation downwards. However, in hover or at low speeds this would not be the case. 
The precise effect of the main rotor downwash for the results of this comparison was left 
open within the scope of the study.
The Figure 41 shows the calculated static line position at the time of the parachutist 
separation (Start) and Figure 43 the stabilised or trim position of the static line after the 
jumper has separated and the static line’s up-swing ended (Trim). The Figure 42 and Figure 
44 show the respective flight test results. The jumper separation point is here defined as 
the moment when the parachute suspension lines are deployed and the canopy fabric is 
just starting to extract from the D-bag. In this case the airstream is not yet significantly 
deflecting the static line-D-bag-parachute –combination backwards.
APPENDIX 11
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Figure 41. Calculated static line deviation angles at the moment of the parachutist sepa-
ration (with floor mounted static lines), based on NHI’s analysis [10]. Angles 
for 60 and 80 knots have been measured directly from the Figure 10. The 
angle for 50 knots was interpolated.
Figure 42.   The measured static line deflection angles at the time of the parachutist se-
paration for 50, 60 and 80 knots. All images are from test #4 “Paratrooper 
jumps”. The 50 knots image is of test point #1, the 60 knots of test point #2 
and the 80 knots of test point #12 (see Table 5 for details).
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Figure 43.    Calculated static line deviation angles in the ultimate or trim position (for floor 
mounted static lines), based on NHI’s analysis [10]. Angles for 60 and 80 knots 
have been measured directly from the Figure 10.  The angle for 50 knots was 
interpolated.
Figure 44. The measured static line deflection angles in the trim case for 50, 60 and 80 
knots. All images are from test #4 “Paratrooper jumps”. The 50 knots image 
is of test point #1, the 60 knots of test point #2 and the 80 knots of test point 
#12 (see Table 5 for details).
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In Figure 42 and in Figure 44 the static line deflection angles were measured against the 
geometrical vertical and horizontal (Earth coordinates), as the ambient airflow affecting the 
static line was horizontal. The use of Earth referenced coordinates also helped to overcome 
the fact that the helicopter’s longitudinal pitch angle in trimmed flight conditions varied 
with	airspeed	up	to	6°	in	the	tested	regime.	Therefore	the	helicopter’s	fuselage	would	not	
have been a solid and good reference for static line deviation measurements. The Earth 
referenced horizontal and vertical were defined from the real horizon visible on the video 
footage.
When the calculated and the flight test results for 50–80 knots were compared, there seemed 
to be a surprisingly good correlation. All the calculated deflection angles fit inside the test 
results,	considering	the	error	margins.	The	error	margins	were	rather	large	(up	to	±10°)	due	
to the parallax error caused by the chase H/C position, the sensitivity of the “Start” angle for 
the parachute deployment phase and the fluttering of the D-bag in the “Trim”. In spite of 
the	error	margins	the	comparison	was	clearly	indicative.	The	±10	°	accuracy	in	defining	the	
static line’s positions in this kind of an extremely complex scenario seemed sufficient with a 
sound engineering judgment. Despite the good correlation at 50–80 knots, the calculations 
could not predict all the details of the static lines dynamics. Such examples were the trim 
position high amplitude rotation at 40 knots, the flutter in trim position at all airspeeds, the 
effect of side slip and the effect of the D-bag’s longitudinal position along the fuselage (see 
Chapter 4.2.2).
The most interesting calculated case, the maximum position of the static line during its 
dynamic up-swing could not be assessed in flight. However, the good correlation of the 
GENSIM calculation and the flight test results indicated, that the method and assumptions 
made in the NHI’s analysis [10] could be used to model a similar new case with a reasonable 
confidence, at least for the airspeed range of 50–80 knots. A full substantiation for this claim 
cannot be achieved until the simulation is done with the same setup (floor mounted anchor 
etc.) as what was used in these flight tests.
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